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Abstract 
This report continues our efforts to provide useful insights and a partial 
framework for understanding ongoing developments in the international defense 
marketplace.  Among other things, defense industrial affairs are becoming 
increasingly global and increasingly complex. 
In this discussion, we focus more on defense firms—considering the 
organization of Boeing 787 development and production, the KC-45 aerial tanker 
competition, and European defense firms’ direct investment in the US defense 
market.  In the 787 case, we observe that even experienced companies such as 
Boeing can run afoul of the complexities of coordinating a multiform venture. 
The KC-45, at least so far, seems to illustrate a new weakness of defense 
establishments relative to their suppliers.  It is reasonable to suppose the two rival 
bidders (NG-EADS and Boeing) will continue to have veto powers over source 
selection—absent some fresh thinking. 
European defense firms’ (BAE, EADS and Finmeccanica) entry into the US 
defense market through various direct investment strategies results from an 
increasingly globalized defense market.  More importantly, perhaps, it demonstrates 
their ability to work around obstacles posed by US legislative and regulatory barriers. 
One major theme is that increased complexity of agile suppliers’ methods and 
relationships poses significant problems for their bureaucratic customers. 
Keywords: international defense marketplace, Boeing 787, the KC-45 aerial 
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Section I. Introduction 
This report continues a line of inquiry discussed in Franck, Lewis, and Udis 
(2008). We’re interested in analyzing recent developments in the defense industrial 
base as an international system.  We have also focused primarily on North American 
(primarily the United States) and Europe (primarily the EU).  While there is 
considerable defense industrial expertise and capacity outside those regions, these 
areas contain most of the major players in the world’s defense trading system.  
Hence, our focus (so far) has been predominantly on the US and the EU. 
While we chose the US and EU to make our research task somewhat 
manageable, an international focus on defense industry is appropriate.  For some 
time, defense industries have been getting increasingly globalized—reflecting an 
increasingly interconnected world economy.  However, globalized defense 
production poses special problems for those involved.  Capability to provide for 
national security is rightly regarded as a core competency of the nation-state, and 
dependence upon foreign suppliers, who might become indifferent or hostile, is a 
continual problem for nations participating in the global defense market.   
Accordingly, the national strategies for coping with this dilemma are a major 
force shaping international commerce in defense.  Our previous report, for example, 
discusses the UK’s Defense Industrial Strategy as a serious and thoughtful effort to 
deal with this problem (pp. 94-108).  Others include various regulations and 
prohibitions built into US law (and are discussed in Section IV of this report).   
Within that context, this report focuses on three recent developments in global 
defense industries: management of complex and global supply chains, competitive 
source selection when there are international implications, and direct investment (or 
merger) as a corporate strategy.   
Section II discusses the case of managing a complex, distributed production 
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example comes from commercial aerospace, the Boeing 787.  However, Boeing’s 
misadventures in coordinating 787 development and production provide useful 
insights for the defense industrial sector as well.  In particular, it examines the US 
export control regime as it relates to increasingly globalized defense industries. 
Section III continues our discussion of the KC-45 competition. 1  This report 
takes a US DoD (and Air Force) perspective in considering the effort to start 
recapitalizing the US aerial refueling fleet —from lease initiative to the recent 
postponement of the KC-45 source selection process.  We believe the events speak 
for themselves.  The KC-45 is a matter of great importance for the United States.  It 
involves acquisition of equipment that is either off-the-shelf or requires a relatively 
modest development program.  Despite the need and despite the technical maturity 
of the system, the US acquisition process has failed to produce a useful result; in 
fact, it has failed to produce any result at all.  Section III offers a narrative of the KC-
X (or KC-45) affair.  This section also offers some tentative conclusions and 
recommendations.  Fundamentally, there is reason to believe (pending full airing of 
the relevant facts) that the US acquisition process is maladapted to doing defense 
business on a global scale. 
Section IV considers, in considerable detail, three major European firms’ 
(BAE, EADS and Finmeccanica) efforts to enter the US market through direct 
investment.  This can take the form of corporate acquisitions or “organic” growth by 
building production capacity within US borders.  Foreign direct investment may also 
be a useful complement to partnerships with US defense firms.2  In particular, 
                                            
1 Our previous report took an EADS/Airbus-centered view, as we analyzed EADS’ KC-30 proposal as 
an offset, a means of persuading a prospective customer understandably cautious about a foreign 
supplier, and as a coherent part of an unfolding corporate strategy for EADS. (Franck, Lewis, & Udis, 
2008, pp. 108-116.) 
2 For example, EADS/Airbus and Northrop-Grumman formed a partnership for the KC-30 proposal.   
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Section IV considers obstacles to entering the US defense markets, and various 
strategies for working around those obstacles. 
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Section II. Boeing 787: Unprecedented Global 
Outsourcing of a Commercial Aircraft 
Introduction 
The Boeing 787 Dreamliner, while a commercial aircraft, is a relevant case 
study in the context of the globalization of the defense industry.  Major defense 
systems, especially those developed in the US, are often criticized for trying to 
implement immature, “bleeding edge” technologies and for attempting to integrate 
multiple examples of these technologies into the same weapon system.  Additionally, 
development time is compressed for budgetary reasons that results in insufficient 
time, money and personnel to properly develop and integrate subsystems.  Typical 
outcomes are significant cost overruns, cutbacks in capability and in the number of 
units purchased, or outright cancelation before full-scale manufacturing begins 
(GAO, 2006, 2008).  
During the 1990s, Boeing set new benchmarks with its production of the 777.  
This mid-sized airliner was the first to clearly demonstrate that a two-engine aircraft 
could fly long-range routes, particularly over oceans.  Additionally, Boeing 
demonstrated that it could outsource the design and production of major parts of the 
aircraft, which also used Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastic (CFRP) for major non-
critical subassemblies.  Finally, the 777 was the first “paperless” aircraft to be 
designed entirely using networked computers that enabled concurrent engineering 
with major suppliers.  The key software tool used was CATIA (Computer-Aided 
Three-Dimensional Information Architecture) developed by France’s Dassault 
Systèmes (Sabbagh, 1996; Sharma & Bowonder, 2004; Smock, 2007).  
The development of the 787, which is expected to enter service in 2009 
(Boeing, May 2008) represents a more cautious approach to implementing 
revolutionary technology than is typical with many military programs but arguably 
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competitor, Airbus.  The distinction emerges because Boeing has not only decided 
to offer a completely new type of airliner, which for the first time makes extensive 
use of Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastic (CFRP) for the fuselage and wings, but has 
also outsourced production to a degree never before accomplished (Jane’s, 2008).3   
Accordingly, changing both the underlying technology and resulting 
performance characteristics of a very complex product and the degree of vertical 
integration (and resulting criticality of coordination among all members of the 787 
supply chain) represent, in toto, a significant advance in commercial aircraft 
production.  Boeing has more freedom to operate in leading the production of the 
787 than it would when producing military aircraft.  However, the challenges of 
coordination and technology maturity are highly similar to those encountered in the 
development of advanced weapons systems. 
A Major Shift in Commercial Aircraft Design and Production 
The 787 has two distinctive new characteristics.  First, CFRP represents 
about half the weight of the aircraft, including the fuselage and wings. This radical 
increase in the use of composites has never been attempted before in an airliner 
and represents a major change in the nature of the product.   
 Fuel consumption and emissions are reduced by about 20% compared 
to aircraft using the same engines to fly comparable routes.   
 Passengers can benefit from more comfortable higher humidity levels 
since composites can handle higher humidity than traditional metal 
alloys.  
 Larger windows are possible, and the aircraft can be pressurized to 
5,000 feet rather than the usual 8,000 feet, increasing passenger 
comfort, since the a CFRP fuselage is stronger. 
                                            
3 The 777, while it represented a significant increase in outsourcing compared to earlier Boeing 
models, had a design that was really more of an incremental improvement over earlier aircraft, such 
as the smaller but similar 767.  The 777 was manufactured using 12% composites, with the 
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Airlines are anxious to put fuel-conserving aircraft in service.  Global fuel 
prices are quite high and may well be volatile and uncertain for an extended period 
of time.  Also upcoming national and international regulations will likely limit (or tax) 
carbon emissions by aircraft, a matter closely associated with fuel consumption.  
Also, passenger comfort is increasingly important since (at least in the US) flights 
are increasingly delayed or have more and more “padded” schedules to avoid 
reporting late flights.  Finally, older models of aircraft in the same 210-330 
passenger class such as the Boeing 757 and 767 are no longer considered fuel 
efficient and will start reaching the end of their economic lives when the first 
deliveries of the Dreamliner begin in 2010 (Wilson, 2008).  
Boeing has been rewarded for this innovation by the largest initial order in 
airliner history: 857 firm orders, plus an undisclosed number of options, by February 
25, 2008 (Wilson, 2008; Boeing, 2008; Jane’s, 2008). From a marketing perspective, 
the 787 is an unqualified success, and comparisons can be made with other “game 
changing” Boeing products such as the 707 (1954), the first commercially successful 
jet airliner (a development closely related to the US Air Force’s KC-135A 
Stratotanker), and the 747 (1969)—the latter still in production 40 years later as both 
the 747-400/400F and the 747-8 freighter.  The 747 remains the most successful 
widebody aircraft in history, with possible passenger sales of the latter variant 
(Boeing, 2008). 
Outsourcing, Globalization and the Challenge of Integration 
While the 787 Dreamliner represents a major production innovation and an 
initial marketing success, there are formidable challenges associated with its 
production.  As stated above, composites are being used to an unprecedented 
extent.  At the same time, 70% of the aerostructure workload (i.e., fuselage, wings, 
and flight control surfaces) is being outsourced— entailing a degree of cooperation 
and coordination that has never been attempted before.  For example, fuselage 
barrels and wings are produced by Alenia in Italy, Spirit Aerosystems in Wichita, KA 
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To rapidly move the completed assemblies to Boeing’s plant near Seattle, 
Boeing has enlarged four 747-400 aircraft to create “Dreamlifters,” which can haul 
more cargo by volume than any other aircraft in the world (Beauclair, 2007; Boeing, 
2008).   
The difficulties of coordination and the rapid development of this revolutionary 
aircraft have led to multiple redesigns of critical components, notably the center wing 
box, which is the structural “core” of any aircraft.  Additionally, the intense levels of 
communication and cooperation required by outsourcing have not always 
materialized, with expectations of suppliers at all tiers needing downward adjustment 
in many cases. 
The 787 program involves about 30 key “Tier 1” suppliers.  Each of these is 
being asked to receive parts from Tier 2 and 3 suppliers, fabricate assemblies and 
test them so that they are ready for incorporation into the aircraft.  Essentially, 
Boeing realized it needed to spread the risk as well as the development costs of the 
787.  A notable 70% of the aircraft, measured by the cost of parts and labor, comes 
from overseas (Crown & Epstein, 2008). 
This approach was intended to shorten cycle time and significantly reduce the 
research, development, and production costs needed to build such a novel design.  
When this complex system began to break down, Boeing had all suppliers deliver to 
its Seattle-area plant, causing chaos.  The result is a current production delay of 
about 19 months over that originally forecast, with launch now estimated in early 
2010. 
The supply chain problems, which were the largest cause of production 
delays, other than the design of the center wing box, would seem to have been 
preventable.  While Boeing has a long history of working with certain suppliers, the 
fast pace of 787 development and production required bringing completely new 
partners into the network, for critical assemblies, often from overseas.  Wayne 
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It hasn’t been as big a brouhaha as occurred at Airbus, which took the 
“everything is fine” routine, a lot of which was for internal consumption.  In 
Boeing’s case, it was more that they didn’t really go out and aggressively 
check on their suppliers, he says.  Boeing has had many years of trusted 
relationships with suppliers, from whom they got consistent results. With this 
airplane, they went out and got a whole bunch of new suppliers from every 
conceivable country on Earth and then didn’t pay attention, didn’t check them 
out, and they got sunshine reports too much.  That was what led to the 
program management change—the new guy has a history of being a 
company trouble-shooter, making things work. And he was the one who made 
the decision to formally delay to make sure they would have time to fix things. 
(Wilson, 2008)  
When supply chain problems began, Boeing management did not try to 
increase communication or provide assistance to the suppliers; rather, they tried to 
resolve the problem by taking assembly responsibility away from the Tier 1 suppliers 
as described above.  Richard Aboulafia of the Teal Group, a well-known aviation 
consultant, explains the cultural environment of Boeing’s purchasing practices: 
Aboulafia goes so far as to predict that big international commercial 
manufacturers such as Boeing eventually will develop a system of on-site 
contract supervision not unlike the US government’s defense contact 
auditors. “Without the same top-heavy bureaucracy, it is heading in that 
direction, for sure,” he says. “You can’t just outsource without direct 
supervision, without verification. Everyone has been moving more and more 
design and integration responsibility to the subcontractors, but without 
adequate oversight, they might have leaped too far. They just assumed a 
contract and a handshake meant everything would show up on time, because 
it had in the past, and that was just the way business was done. (Wilson, 
2008)  
The situation seems remarkable, even allowing for the complexity and 
challenges of the 787 and the use of a global aerospace industry.  The comparison 
with the defense industry is also interesting, as we will discuss below.  The issue of 
the nature, quality, and sustainability of Boeing’s in-house expertise and production 
capabilities with respect to commercial aircraft has become a commonly-discussed 
issue in the aerospace media (Epstein & Crown, 2008).   
These difficulties are related to Boeing’s longstanding white-collar labor 
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influence the extent to which Boeing can either competitively produce an aircraft or 
parts thereof by itself or has been forced by its management practices and labor 
relations into a position where meeting the tough deadlines imposed by competitive 
forces leaves Boeing with the sole choice of global outsourcing. 
David P. Hess, the president of Hamilton Sundstrand—Boeing’s leading 
systems supplier for the 787 and a subsidiary of United Technologies—provided 
some interesting insights in an interview with Aviation Week & Space Technology 
that led to a large number of letters to the editor.  Hess’ comments deal not only with 
the 787 supply chain issue (which he feels has been successfully resolved) but with 
the relationship of outsourcing to Boeing’s long-term corporate strategy.  The 
benefits and costs of Boeing’s approach need to be carefully weighed, as it can also 
benefit suppliers: 
Boeing initially won kudos from investors for outsourcing the design and 
production of key 787 structures to partners across the US, Europe and 
Japan. The company also required those suppliers to make hefty 
investments, allowing Boeing to spread the project's risk. But the logistics 
breakdown has raised questions about whether the strategy will succeed. 
Some workers have criticized the outsourcing and say the company hasn't 
retained enough engineering talent to ensure that work is being done 
adequately. 
But Hess says the streamlined production model was key to allowing 
Hamilton Sundstrand to quickly implement innovations to the electrical system 
needed for the aircraft to achieve its higher fuel efficiency. In the old days, he 
notes, Boeing would have had to waste time and money vetting and 
coordinating such changes among an array of suppliers. 
Hess acknowledges that the 787's logistics model is challenging. He 
estimates that only 10% of Hamilton Sundstrand's components go directly to 
Boeing, with the rest being shipped to top-tier structures suppliers such as 
Spirit AeroSystems, Global Aeronautica and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. 
Those companies then integrate the systems into their structures before 
shipping them to Everett for final assembly. “If you look at managing that 
supply chain and keeping it all synchronized and schedules harmonized, it's 
complex,” Hess says. 
Still, he predicts Boeing's maligned supply chain model will ultimately prove 
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But once they get to that point, I think it will be a big benefit to them. 
(Anselmo, 2008)  
Since the 1980s, management practices that originated with Toyota involve 
end-item manufacturers carefully monitoring supplier performance, place 
representatives at supplier plants (and vice versa), and be ready to “jump in” and 
assist suppliers to improve their processes within the context of a long-term, 
cooperative relationship (Avery, 2007; Liker, 2003; O’Sullivan, 2006).  
As described in the quotation above, this eventually happened with the 
Dreamliner, but Boeing would have done better to recognize this problem  when 
planning to radically increase the number and responsibilities of its suppliers.   
The production delays have benefited some airlines, particularly in the US, 
which are rapidly losing money due to fuel costs, and they view the delay as a lucky 
occurrence (Moad, 2007; Matlack, 2008).  Ironically, less than 6% of Dreamliner 
orders are from US carriers, whose current losses are compounded by the higher 
fuel consumption and maintenance costs of older aircraft.  For example, when 
American Airlines was ordered in early 2008 to ground its MD-80 aircraft for wiring 
inspection, the average age of the aircraft was 18 years.  The lack of internal or 
external capital available to US airlines to finance new aircraft compounds the issue 
and leads to a vicious circle. 
Proposals by the current Administration to expand permissible foreign 
ownership of US airlines from 25% of voting stock and 49% of total stock have been 
blocked in Congress, keeping cash-rich European carriers from investing in US 
airlines.  Allowing increased foreign ownership and control by European Union (EU) 
member states is a prerequisite for complete implementation of the EU-US bilateral 
aviation agreement, whose initial phases recently went into effect.  US airlines have 
been quick to take advantage of increased access to Europe, shifting flights from 
money-losing domestic US routes to more lucrative transatlantic flights and reducing 
domestic capacity further by similarly moving widebody aircraft to transatlantic 
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However, given that almost all of Boeing’s 787 customers are more profitable 
foreign carriers, the firm’s current situation has been described as follows: 
If airliner orders continue at their present pace—the company has won more 
than 400 orders through the end of May—the company will add more than 
900 planes to its backlog this year. Boeing already has enough airliners on 
back order to keep its Washington production lines moving at the present 
pace for up to seven years without another order in the interim.  The fuel 
crisis is causing some airlines to postpone orders, but the company’s 
conservation production pace can be sustained for years even if orders begin 
melting away. (Gillie, 2008) 
At least in the near term, it appears that the Dreamliner will appear mostly in 
foreign airlines, whose healthier financial condition allows for modernized fleets with 
more comfortable and fuel-efficient aircraft with lower maintenance costs. 
Implications for Design and Production of Military Aircraft 
There are only two manufacturers of what we would characterize as large 
airliners.4  These would be aircraft destined to carry passengers or commercial cargo 
that exceed the size of regional jets and turboprops.  There a number of implicit 
characteristics of how Boeing and Airbus deal with their (principally) airline 
customers, as well as with leasing firms (since the majority of airliners today are 
leased by the airlines, the leasing firm retains ownership). 
Airlines or leasing firms, particularly those with a history of doing business 
with Boeing or Airbus, are consulted early and frequently during the design of a new 
aircraft (or variant).  The airlines’ specific needs can be generally described.  They 
are primarily interested in capacity (i.e., passenger and/or cargo of different types), 
passenger comfort and amenities, range, noise, weight, cruising speed and altitude, 
fuel consumption, carbon emissions, and the performance of the aircraft in 
                                            
4 For example, Aviation Week’s 2008 Aerospace Source Book (pp. 74-77) lists only Airbus and 
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combination with one or more engine types (which have traditionally been offered by 
the engine manufacturer and chosen by the customer).5   
Changes in technology, like the use of composites, integrated avionics (e.g., 
the “glass cockpit” with a small number of electronic displays replacing hundreds of 
dials, gauges and switches) and electronic flight bags (replacing the bulky charts 
and rule books carried by the pilot and first officer), emerge gradually and are 
incorporated in a relatively smooth manner into new aircraft types and are often 
retrofitted into older models (just as newer, quieter and more fuel efficient engines 
are placed on older airplanes). 
While the above description is necessarily simplified for purposes of this 
discussion, the end-item assembler or “airframer,” (i.e., Boeing or Airbus) requires 
expertise sufficient to develop and produce the entire aircraft (or alternatively to 
maintain requisite in-house knowledge to effectively work with suppliers at all tiers).  
For example, while Boeing has never produced an aircraft engine, engine design is 
a critical part of aircraft design.  The same could be said for the hundreds of 
electronic systems (or “avionics”) installed onboard that present a major challenge 
for systems integration. 
Airlines and aircraft leasing firms are the key buyers of aircraft, and they must 
also have considerable in-house expertise to advise Boeing and Airbus of their 
requirements and to subsequently operate and maintain the aircraft.  However, the 
principal base of both tacit and explicit knowledge in all aspects of aircraft design, 
development, manufacturing, assembly, operation and maintenance resides with 
Boeing or Airbus.   
Outsourcing gives these two airframers more flexibility to obtain the best 
products globally and hopefully allows suppliers to advance their own knowledge 
base within their own product lines (e.g., engines, avionics, or production of 
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composite fuselage sections).  But Boeing or Airbus must remain the 
“knowledgeable customer” down to at least a certain level of subsystem.  These two 
firms are the world leaders not because they have expertise in final assembly of a 
decreasing number of physical parts, but because they have a duopoly on the 
design and integration of the entire airliner as a system. 
The above discussion of commercial aircraft practices is meant to give some 
context when considering practices and trends related to military aircraft.  It is true 
that some aircraft have almost identical airframes and engines than their commercial 
counterparts (such as the Boeing P-8A Poseidon, a derivative of the 737-800).  
Others, such as fighters, have little in common as far as requirements, physical 
characteristics or performance expectations. 
But the difference between generally commercial or military aircraft extends 
further.  For a nation’s defense organization to oversee the entire process of the 
aircraft lifecycle from initial research through to production, operation and 
maintenance requires far more in-house knowledge of the various aircraft-related 
disciplines than any commercial airline would need.  The sheer scale of the 
necessary knowledge base and physical infrastructure limits the role of military 
aircraft development to only a few countries in the world, principally the US, the 
United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Russia and China.   
Other nations’ flying services import their aircraft from one of these countries 
and benefit from stable designs proven in service.  In some ways, importers of 
military aircraft are like airlines and can maintain a reduced in-house knowledge 
base. 
The critical difference between the two markets and types of aircraft, 
therefore, relies on what has been systems maturity or technology readiness level 
(GAO, 2006; GAO 2008c).  In particular, the DoD often requires the development, 
production and integration of technologies that do not yet exist or are immature.  
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develop and field a new military aircraft—often exceeding 20 years.  A contrasting 
example of commercial aircraft strategy is given by Boeing’s approach to develop a 
replacement for its 737: 
Boeing is abandoning its long-running effort to devise a successor to the 737, 
driven back to the drawing board by the lack of existing technology that can 
deliver the huge leap in performance airlines want for a next-generation 
single-aisle aircraft. 
The decision to disband the 737RS (replacement study) design project, 
because it fell short of critical performance targets, has implications beyond 
Boeing. It will likely influence how Airbus moves forward on its A320 
replacement effort, the A30X. For airlines, it means an even longer wait until a 
737 or A320 follow-on hits the market. 
For Boeing, the focus now switches to more fundamental research into 
aerodynamics, composites and other advanced alloys and hybrid materials, 
systems and propulsion in the hope that concepts will emerge to meet the 
challenge. 
The manufacturer openly admits the change of strategy, saying, “We know 
customers are demanding really high targets for this aircraft, and we know 
that with the state of technology, we're not going to get there anytime soon.” 
As a result, Boeing adds, “We're focusing on technology efforts and reducing 
the aircraft design effort while the technology matures.” (Norris & Wall, 2008)  
Essentially, Boeing’s board will only authorize the firm to offer for sale an 
aircraft that offers a controlled amount of risk in return for the revenues, profits and 
resulting market share. While it is often said that Boeing or Airbus “bets the 
company” on each new model, the wager is a carefully considered one.  The DoD 
deals with an entirely different set of concerns and acts accordingly, and the results 
have been summarized as follows. 
Leading commercial companies use three key techniques for successfully 
developing and transitioning technologies, with the basic premise being that 
technologies must be mature before transitioning to the product line side. 
 Strategic planning at the corporate level: Strategic planning 
precedes technology development so managers can gauge market 
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 Gated management reviews: A rigorous process is used to ensure a 
technology’s relevancy and feasibility and enlist product line 
commitment to use the technologies once the labs are finished 
maturing them. 
 Corroborating tools: To secure commitment, technology transition 
agreements solidify and document specific cost, schedule, and 
performance metrics labs need to meet for transition to occur. 
Relationship managers address transition issues within the labs and product 
line teams and across both communities. Meaningful metrics gauge project 
progress and process effectiveness. 
Not only does DoD lack the breadth and depth of these techniques, the 
department routinely accepts high levels of technology risk at the start of 
major weapon acquisition programs. The acquisition community works with 
technologies before they are ready to be transitioned and takes on 
responsibility for technology development and product development 
concurrently […] A defined phase for technology transition is not evident. 
These shortcomings contribute significantly to DoD’s poor cost and schedule 
outcomes for developing technology.  
The numerous examples of DoD programs that have incurred cost overruns, 
schedule delays, and reduced performance serve as reminders that inserting 
a few best practices and changing the mechanics of technology transition 
processes without changing the environment that determines incentives may 
not produce better outcomes. (GAO, 2006)  
Another major factor beyond the scope of this paper but worth mentioning is 
the particular nature of globalization’s impact on the defense and aerospace sector, 
with Cold-War era US legislation such as the Berry Amendment (requiring certain 
metals come from US sources) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(which create a complex system of technology export controls).   
To some extent, “workarounds” allowing specific exports to partner nations 
and their industries have been developed by the Administration through multiple 
bilateral agreements providing a security “perimeter” around the US and each of the 
other nations with respect to individual programs.  This is how the multinational Joint 
Strike Fighter is being managed.  However, a sound national or multinational system 
has yet to emerge, and the post-Cold War multilateral regime, centered on the 
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Administration or Congress (Demisch, 2006).  Congress does not hesitate to act 
unilaterally, for example, through an outright ban on exports of the Lockheed Martin 
F-22 Raptor aircraft, which was highly desired by Japan (Shiibashi & Perrett, 2007).  
In our view, a major reform of technology export controls is a prerequisite to 
any significant degree of globalization of the defense industry.  However, even the 
defense industries and armed services of the three closest allies of the US—
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom—have suffered during the post 9/11 
period from what is well understood as a high degree of risk aversion by the US 
Administration and Congress.  Realistically, there will be little to no support for 
serious reform until the globalization of the commercial aircraft industry backs the 
US government and defense industry into a corner, with attendant potential for the 
domestic loss of jobs, exports, or votes. 
While the decision to offer and launch production of the 787 represented a 
risk for Boeing, the firm followed all of the steps recommended above to effectively 
manage that risk.  To do otherwise would make no sense in a competitive 
environment.  Not only do Airbus and Boeing depend on a steady flow of production 
and orders for aircraft, but airlines do as well.  An excellent example is the record 
sales level achieved by the 787 with the impact of its reduced fuel consumption and 
(perhaps) higher degree of passenger comfort, which will have an effect on airline 
revenues and profitability. 
Conclusion 
The unprecedented degree of outsourcing and globally dispersed suppliers 
for the Boeing 787 Dreamliner has been controversial, and the delivery delays of the 
completed aircraft caused by poor supply chain management (essentially a lack of 
attention to basic supplier relations) have significantly impacted Boeing’s short-term 
profitability.  However, Boeing currently retains the capability to profitably design and 
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A key lesson learned for the DoD is that the endless repetition of the term 
“commercial practices” as a goal for the Department and its contractors is not a 
simplistic exhortation to emulate the practices of businesses engaged in the 
production of large systems.  Rather, the maintenance of the fundamental 
knowledge base in-house within the DoD and its prime contractors is essential if the 
US is to remain a viable weapons producing nation.6   
Furthermore, the erosion of expertise in areas such as research, engineering, 
contracting and logistics within the DoD constitutes a similar threat in that the 
necessary knowledge can be gained only over time during a coherent career in the 
military or the civil service.  Without it, the DoD (or any other military establishment) 
cannot remain a knowledgeable customer.  And, only a knowledgeable customer 
can ensure that its suppliers continue to perform adequately.  To avoid these 
threats, the DoD needs relief from legal, regulatory and congressional restrictions 
that are inconsistent with the realities of globalization.  Also, the DoD must manage 
its human capital to develop the expertise to effectively manage a wide variety of 
sourcing arrangements—either by its prime contractors or lower tiers in the supply 
chain. 
                                            
6 We reach similar conclusions regarding the UK in our discussion of the UK’s Defense Industrial 
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Section III. The KC-45 Competition 
Introduction and Overview 
This section extends and updates our discussion of the KC-45 (nee KC-X)7 
competition for the next generation Air Force aerial tanker.  Our previous report on 
this same subject focused on EADS-Airbus’ actions to enter the North American 
(especially US) defense market (Franck, Lewis, & Udis, 2008, pp. 108-116).  We 
considered this matter from the perspectives of offsets in international defense trade, 
vertical firm boundaries (primarily with Transaction Cost Economics), and corporate 
strategy (drawing upon some standard models).  While we found considerable 
explanatory power from all three perspectives, the corporate strategy view proved 
especially useful. 
This report continues with that EADS-centered viewpoint in another section, 
as we consider its strategy for direct investment in the US defense market.  
However, this particular section is primarily focused on the US Department of 
Defense: the Air Force in particular.  Our discussion will proceed as follows. 
First is the context in which the KC-45 competition has been conducted.  
Aerial refueling is clearly a core competence of the US Air Force and the US military 
establishment in general.  Power projection depends upon deep strike operations—
much of which is accomplished through manned aircraft.  Aerial refueling of strike 
aircraft is a sine qua non of deep strike missions.  Accordingly, it was reasonable to 
place high priority on acquiring a new tanker to replace part of the aging KC-135 
fleet.  However, the KC-X was viewed as only part of the (very) long-term solution.  
We will also discuss the outlines of the overall aerial refueling plan, 
                                            
7 We will use KC-X and KC-45 as being largely interchangeable.  The project started as the “KC-X” 
and was designated KC-45 in early 2008.  The NG-EADS proposal for the KC-X was generally called 
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Second, we’ll summarize the events which led up to the KC-X competition 
between Boeing (KC-767) and Northrop Grumman-Airbus EADS (KC-30).  The 
major developments included (a) the abortive attempt to acquire 100 KC-767 tankers 
(some leased) from Boeing, and (b) EADS’ efforts to enter the US defense market. 
Third are the major events associated with the original KC-45 competition.  Of 
special interest are (a) the NG-Airbus threat to not respond to the original Request 
for Proposal (RFP) in early 2007, and the Air Force response, (b) the selection 
criteria (although not publicly available as yet), and (c) the events surrounding the 
original award to the KC-30 proposal. 
Fourth is the Boeing protest and subsequent events.  We’ll consider Boeing’s 
major complaints, the inside-Beltway response and the GAO decision.  The aborted 
recompetition for the KC-45 contract will conclude our discussion of this particular 
case. 
Finally, we’ll offer some tentative observations and conclusions from this 
particular case.  They are tentative because the KC-45 competition is an ongoing 
story.  Much of the relevant information has not yet been released and documents 
which have been released (e.g., the GAO decision on the Boeing protest8) have 
much that’s both interesting and useful redacted from the public version.  As a result, 
we’ve relied on press reports and press releases more than one would prefer in a 
scholarly report.  While these have been both informative and useful, they should be 
regarded as only tentatively authoritative—pending the release of the full record. 
Background 
Aerial refueling is clearly a core competency of the US military establishment 
(especially the Air Force).  A longstanding American strategic tradition prescribes 
                                            





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 21 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
engagement of threats in areas other than the homeland as a highly preferred mode 
of operation; in fact, there’s good reason to believe that the proposition that wars 
should be fought as far away as possible from the homeland is a major (if not 
explicit) foundation of US national security and military strategies. 
Accordingly, the ability to “project” military power to distant areas (“theaters”) 
is a necessary foundation for executing US military strategy.  Power projection 
against reasonably strong opposition is difficult, at best, without significant capability 
for long-range strikes.  The primary vehicles for such strikes are manned aircraft—at 
ranges significantly beyond their nominal range-payload capabilities.  The long-
standing solution for this particular problem is aerial refueling—mating tankers with 
strike aircraft to extend their combat range.   
Therefore, the US Air Force has maintained large and capable aerial refueling 
fleets ever since it learned how to do aerial refueling reliably.  Post-World War II 
aircraft have included bomber variants such as KB-29s and KB-50s.  But the most 
successful tankers were variants of commercial transports:  KC-97 (Boeing 377), 
KC-135 (Boeing 717), and KC-10 (McDonnell-Douglas DC-10).  Most current US 
aerial refueling capability resides in some 59 KC-10s and 500+ KC-135s.  In the 
1990s (following the Cold War), this force was generally considered adequate to 
meet refueling needs for some time to come. 
However, with the end of the 1990s, some second thoughts had emerged—
associated primarily with the age of the KC-135 fleet—delivered between 1957 and 
1965.9  Risks associated with these aging airframes were, (1) increasing 
maintenance costs (perhaps rapidly increasing), and (2) low availability due, among 
other things, to structural aging and unforeseen failures.  Difficulties with KC-135Es 
                                            
9 These concerns were welll documented in formal reports such as Defense Science Board (2004), 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 22 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
have both confirmed these concerns and brought greater attention to the KC-135 
age issue.10 
Given the importance of aerial refueling and the risks associated with the KC-
135 fleet, it seemed prudent to (a) start recapitalizing the fleet, and (b) hedge against 
serious availability problems with KC-135s.11  The first initiative along these lines 
began in 2001—in an effort to lease 100 tanker versions of the Boeing 767.  
Following an extended period of challenges, compromises and scandals, this “KC-
767” program was abandoned.12 
The new tanker initiatives were conceptually founded on a strategy for 
replacing the entire fleet.  Over a period of decades, the Air Force proposed to field 
600 KC-135R-equivalents with (notionally) three new tankers: KC-X, -Y, and –Z – 
each (notionally) offering about 200 R-equivalents of refueling capability.13   
The original Boeing 767 lease-and-buy proposal was replaced by a 
competition for a new Air Force tanker.  The program was conceived as totaling 179 
aircraft.  Boeing responded with a proposal featuring KC-767s.  Tanker variants of 
the Boeing 767 are scheduled for service with the Italian Air Force and the Japanese 
Air Self Defense Force.  Northrop-Grumman14 and EADS responded with the “KC-
                                            
10 Both KC-135Es and KC-135Rs are modified KC-135As (the original model delivered with J57 
turbojet engines).  In the 1980s, the E models were re-engined with used commercial engines 
(JT3Ds, low-bypass turbofans) —many of which were available due to Boeing 707 retirements from 
commercial service.  The R models received new high-bypass turbofans (CFM-56s).  While improved 
fuel efficiency made both models better tankers, the R models received a much more extensive 
upgrade (rudder, landing gear, engine struts, etc.), which extended their operational life.  The E 
models, which were much less extensively upgraded, not surprisingly, have shown more signs of 
aging. 
11 With constant refueling capability, those 100 KC-767s would have permitted retiring all KC-135Es 
and about 65 KC-135Rs – leaving the bulk of the KC-135 force still in service. 
12 These rather bizarre episodes were summarized nicely by Knight, et al. (2008), pp. 31-32. 
13 For an excellent summary of this tanker “road map.” Consult Knight (2008,pp. 16-17). 
14 The partnership EADS with Northrop-Grumman in offering the KC-30 seems to have been at least 
partly the result of EADS’ strategic calculations, within the larger context of establishing itself as a 
major supplier to the US defense establishment.  This is discussed in some of our previous work. 
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30,” a variant of the Airbus A330.  The KC-30 is programmed for service with 
Australia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom.15 
Table 1.  Key Performance Parameters for the KC-X Competition 
KPP Brief Description Required Performance 
1 Aerial Tanker Capability Able to refuel all current & programmed fixed-wing 
aircraft 
2 Fuel Offload Fuel-Range characteristics equivalent to KC-135R 
3 Communications, etc. Able to operate worldwide in military and civil 
airspace 
4 Airlift Capability Able to carry passengers, patients, palletized 
cargo 
5 Receiver Capability Able to refuel inflight from boom-equipped aircraft 
6 Force Protection Able to operate in chem. And bio. Environments 
7 Net-Ready Conform enterprise-level critical architecture 
standards 
8 Survivability Various detection means and countermeasures 
9 Multi-point Refueling Multi-point drogue refueling 
(Source: GAO, 2008a, pp 5-6) 
The essentials of the competition involved, first, a set of Key Performance 
Parameters (KPPs) and a “best value” evaluation.  The KPPs are summarized in 
Table 1 above. 
Basically, satisfying the KPPs was the test for admission to the final selection.  
The “best value” assessment considered the following factors.  These are 
summarized in Table 2 below.   
The final KC-X Request for Proposal (RFP) was made available on January 
31, 2007.  The KC-30 team (EADS-Airbus and Northrop-Grumman) objected to an 
earlier version—citing, among other things, the ramp space requirements 
                                            
15 Wikipedia, Airbus A330, Boeing 767.  This was the case at start of the KC-X competition.  Other 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 24 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
specified—which seemed to favor the smaller (Boeing) KC-767.16  Although the 
details were not reported fully in the open press,17 the Air Force apparently revised 
that aspect of the RFP in response to the KC-30 team’s objections (Cole & Lunsford, 
2008).   
Table 2.  KC-X Best Value Selection Criteria 
Mission Capability 
              Key System Requirements; System Integration and Software; Product 
Support;  




Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment (IFARA) 
(Source: GAO (2008a, Boeing Decision, pp. 6-13.) 
KC-30 and KC-767 Compared 
Basic specifications for US tanker and transport aircraft are summarized in 
Table 3 below.  The characteristics featured in the table address operationally 
relevant characteristics that have been featured in the KC-X competition.  The basic 
size of the airframe (wing span and fuselage length) is a primary determinant of 
parking ramp “footprint.”  Among other things, this determines how many aircraft can 
be parked at a given airfield.   
                                            
16 As Table 3.3 makes plain, the KC-30’s ramp “footprint” is greater than existing tankers, and the KC-
767’s.   
17 For reasons that are well founded, US Government disclosures regarding the KC-X competition, so 
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Maximum fuel is a major determinant of overall air refueling capability.18  The 
KC-30 has been estimated as being equivalent (on average) to 1.2 KC-767s, which 
correlates nicely with the ratio of the maximum fuel loads (~1.2).19   
Maximum Pallets is a measure of ability to carry “bulk” cargo—stated in terms 
of standard military 463L cargo pallets.  Pallets are used to package smaller pieces 
of cargo, among other things, to expedite and better organize unloading in theaters 
of operation.  Note that both KC-X candidates have excellent bulk cargo capabilities.  
They can carry more pallets than the C-17—Air Mobility Command’s newest airlifter.  
Further, KC-30s can transport more pallets than KC-10s and a number comparable 
to C-5s.  Also, the KC-767 can carry more pallets (19 vs. 13) than the C-141—a 
highly effective airlifter for almost four decades.20  
                                            
18 Aircraft fuel efficiency is also important.  The KC-135R is considered 50% more capable than the 
KC135A, due primarily to high-bypass turbofans replacing turbojets.  All aircraft in this table feature 
high-bypass turbofan engines.  However, the KC-767 has been assessed as having 35% more 
capability than a KC-135R—due primarily to greater fuel efficiency (from both airframe and engines). 
19 The underlying calculations for that ratio apparently come from the Contingency Mating and 
Ranging Program (CMARPS), an Air Mobility Command analytical tool.  GAO Decision, 18 June 
2008, p. 12.  (It is interesting to note that some internet sources list CMARPS as Combined Mating 
and Ranging Program.)  The ratio in question (1.2:1) has, to our knowledge, never been officially 
released.  However, it was touted in a Northrop Grumman press release, repeated elsewhere, and 
never (as far as we can determine) been challenged (even by Boeing).  NG Press Release, Northrop 
Grumman Tanker is 20 Percent More Capable …”, 18 February 2008. 
20 463L article (undated) from Global Security.org.  However, bulk cargo isn’t the only airlift category.  
There are “oversized” items (such as trucks and ground equipment) and “outsized” items such as 
tanks.  Moreover, mission configuration for any of these aircraft involves a tradeoff involving payload 
(cargo transported to a destination and fuel offloaded to receiver aircraft) and range to be flown.  This 
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Table 3.  Key Characteristics of Selected Tanker and Transport Aircraft 
Current Tankers Current Transports Proposed Tankers Character-
istics KC-135R KC-10 C-5 C-17 KC-767 KC-30 
Wing span / 
Length* 
131/136 165/181 223/247 170/174 156/159 198/192
Max. fuel*** 200 356 330 --**** 200+ 245 
Maximum 
Pallets*** 
6 27 36 18 19 32 
* Feet.   ** Thousands of pounds.   *** Military (463L) pallets.  Smaller than standard 
commercial pallets.   **** Not readily available.  Varies with model; majority are “ER” 
designated. 
(Sources:  Knight et al. 2008, pp.34-37.)  463L information from GlobalSecurity.org; 
Wikipedia articles and Air Force fact sheets for C-5 and C-17 
The Competition 
Conscious of the possibility of an award protest, and the clear possibility of 
that protest being sustained, the Air Force described the competition as being 
especially open and carefully conducted.  (Among other significant events, two 
previous awards to Boeing—the new CSAR-X helicopter and a significant KC-135 
support contract—had already been successfully contested.) 
Because of the high stakes involved, both parties engaged in an energetic 
campaign to mobilize public support and congressional delegations.  Boeing 
emphasized the number of US jobs attributable to a KC-767 selection, while the KC-
30 countered with an ever-more lucrative industrial participation scheme.  This 
started with a proposal configuring basic (“green”) A330 airframes for aerial refueling 
in Alabama.  In early 2008, the offer was sweetened with announced plans to open 
an A330 freighter assembly facility in Alabama as well (Franck, Lewis, & Udis, 2008, 
pp. 108-111).  In previous work, we presented this as an implicit negotiation over an 
offset package (p. 111). 
On February  29, 2008, the Air Force awarded the KC-45 contract to the NG-
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concerned by surprise (except the Air Force source selection insiders).  The Air 
Force ratings (insofar as they are readily available) were as summarized in Table 4 
below. 
The table indicates that both firms offered proposals that met Air Force 
needs.  Life Cycle Cost differences were well within any reasonable view of cost 
estimates’ margins of uncertainty.  It’s reasonable also to conclude that the 
competition (according to Air Force rules) was close.21  Nonetheless, there was 
surprisingly (in our opinion) negative coverage of the Boeing entry, and the Boeing 
Corporation, in the US press.  Headlines like “Boeing vs. Bold Ideas” and references 
to the KC-767 as “frankentanker” were readily evident in published articles (Bailey, 
2008; Herszenhorn, 2008).   
Table 4 Evaluation of KC-767 and KC-30 Proposals 
Mission Capability/Proposal Risk KC-767 (Boeing) KC-30 (NG-EADS) 
 Key System Requirements Blue***/Low Blue/Low 
 Systems Integration/Software Green/moderate Green/moderate 
 Product Support Blue/Low Blue/Low 
 Program Management Green/Low Green/Low 
 Technology Maturity Green Green 




Cost/Price (MPLCC)* $108.044 Billion $108.010 Billion 
 Cost Risk: Development/  
Production & Deployment Phases 
Moderate/Low Low/Low 
IFARA** Effectiveness Value 1.79 1.90 
* Most likely Lifecycle Cost  ** Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Effectiveness 
*** Color rating scheme (Blue, Green, Yellow, Red)  Blue is best; Red worst. 
(Source: GAO, 2008a, pp. 17-25) 
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After meetings with the Air Force, Boeing mounted a rather strong protest to 
the KC-45 contract award on March 11, 2008.22  Boeing’s major complaint was that 
the KC-767 was closer to being the tanker the Air Force originally had in mind, citing 
a “significant gap between the aircraft the Air Force set out to procure […] and the 
much larger Airbus A330-based tanker it ultimately selected.”  The Boeing press 
release continued:  “It is clear that frequent and often unstated changes […] —
including manipulation of evaluation criteria and application of unstated and 
unsupported priorities […] resulted in selection of an aircraft that was radically 
different from that sought by the Air Force…” (Boeing, 2008 March).  According to 
public statements, the Boeing protest was more specifically motivated by the 
following serious flaws in the Air Force evaluation process. 
 “credit” given for passenger and cargo capabilities; 
 evaluation of risks associated with the two proposals; 
 cost assessments; 
 effects of basing characteristics (primarily ramp space needs). (Cole, 
2008, p. B2) 
While the Government Accountability Office (GAO) was considering the 
protest, the public relations and political campaigns continued.  The NG-EADS 
congressional supporters (especially Alabama) supported the Air Force decision.  
The Boeing congressional supporters (especially Washington state) expressed 
outrage at the award of manufacture of a critical military system to a foreign entry.  
As noted above, there is strong evidence for characterizing the KC-45 as “critical.”  
To characterize the NG-EADS proposal as “foreign” became increasingly debatable.  
With NG participation and the Alabama facilities in place, both proposals were 
                                            
22 The extent to which the press’s and think-tanks’ public ridicule of Boeing were a consideration in 
the company’s decision to protest the award are nothing more than a matter for speculation at this 
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estimated to have a large American content.  In fact, some argued that the US 
content of the KC-30 would likely exceed that of the Boeing 787. 
In what appears to be a direct response to the Boeing protest, Northrop 
Grumman issued a number of “why we won” press releases—dated from 23 April 
until 12 June, shortly before the GAO announcement concerning the protest.  The 
essential points cited were  
 Air refueling capacity and “efficiency” 
 Airlift capacity 
 Airframe performance, especially takeoff and range 
 Cost, especially development cost 
 Survivability 
 Overall fleet effectiveness. 23 
The Protest Sustained 
Taking full advantage of the 100-day assessment period, the GAO ruled in 
favor of the Boeing protest—on June 18, 2008.  While finding merit in “only” eight of 
Boeing’s 100 (or so) issues, the GAO decision was nonetheless strongly in favor of 
the Boeing position—and also a surprise to those considered insiders in the 
Washington, DC area. 
The essentials of the GAO findings were given in a 3-page summary 
statement, also issued on June 18, which accompanied a more detailed 68-page 
decision.  The bottom-line conclusion was that the Air Force selection process 
contained substantial flaws, which may well have reversed the choice of winner 
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(GAO, 2008b, p. 2; GAO, 2008a).24  More specifically, the main findings in Boeing’s 
favor were as follows: 
 Insufficient credit to Boeing for meeting non-mandatory technical 
requirements; 
 Additional refueling capability as a “key discriminator” assigned to the 
KC-30, despite evaluation rules that no credit would be assigned for 
doing that; 
 Insufficient support for determination that the KC-30 could refuel all Air 
Force fixed-wing receiver aircraft; 
 “Misleading and unequal discussions” with Boeing concerning 
satisfaction of a key performance parameter; 
 Improper determination that Northrop-Grumman’s “refusal” to support 
organic depot maintenance according to solicitation requirements was 
an administrative oversight; 
 Unreasonable determination of life cycle cost estimates; 
 Improper increase of Boeing’s estimated engineering costs (as part of 
the life cycle cost estimate). (GAO, 2008b, pp. 2-3) 25 
Taken at face value, the GAO findings are a strong affirmation of the overall 
tenor of the Boeing protest, if not all its details.  It’s especially noteworthy that the 
GAO’s main findings may go beyond the allegations in the Boeing complaint (at least 
as they’ve been reported in the press).   
The GAO recommended that the Air Force basically restart the competition, 
to include “reopen(ing) discussions with the offerors.”  It also recommended that the 
statement of Air Force needs be reformulated if the original version did not meet 
aerial tanker needs (GAO, 2008a, p. 67). 
                                            
24 GAO, 2008b, p. 2.  GAO, 2008a). 
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One of the more interesting developments associated with the GAO decision 
was EADS’ immediate decision to defer (indefinitely) the KC-45 (and A330) 
production facilities in Mobile, Alabama.26  Despite EADS statements (Tran, 2007) 
regarding the advisability of locating production facilities in areas with the US dollar 
as currency, this supports our previous conclusion that EADS-Airbus plans for 
facilities in Alabama were part of an offset negotiation (albeit implicit) (Franck, Lewis, 
& Udis, 2008, p. 111).  Another interesting development is that the Air Force became 
the new target for public mobbing —with press and congressional sources openly 
questioning the competence of the service.27  Probably the most direct assessment 
is attributed to Rep. Norm Dicks (WA), “No one has any faith in the Air Force” 
(Associated Press, 2008 July 9).. 
The New Competition 
DoD accepted the GAO’s major recommendations.  It amended the criteria for 
evaluation—most significantly in awarding credit for exceeding refueling capability 
requirements (which clearly favored NG-EADS)28 and extending lifecycle cost 
estimates to 40 years (which probably favored Boeing).  The Office of the Secretary 
of Defense (OSD) replaced the Air Force as the source selection agency—clearly 
not a vote of confidence.  Also, a limited new competition was put on a fast track29 —
with the goal of concluding the source selection by the end of 2008 (which likely 
favored NG-EADS).  On August 6, 2008, both companies received this information in 
the form of a 98-page document that stated “amendments and clarifications” to the 
                                            
26 Northrop Grumman Media Advisory dated 19 June 2008.  This matter is also discussed in Section 4 
of this report. 
27 Gravois describes “mobbing” in academic settings.  (Gravois, 2006) 
28 The revised RFP was quoted in the press as follows: “There is additional value to the government 
for the additional fuel offload amount above the threshold” (Shalel-Esa, 2008). 
29 According to press reports, the “limited rebids” would consider only the issues in which the GAO 
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original request for proposals (RFP).30  Meetings with both Boeing and NG-EADS 
were reported in mid-August (Butler, 2008 August 15).  Stated dates for the final 
RFP slipped from mid-August to early September (Shalel-Esa, 2008; Weber, 2008). 
Sensing what it perceived as an uneven playing field, Boeing essentially 
repeated the NG-EADS ploy of early 2007.  It publicly stated that the timelines for 
the new draft RFP did not permit time for Boeing to submit a competitive proposal— 
(Franck, Lewis and Udis (2008), especially pp. 108-111) which could take the form 
of a tanker version of the Boeing 777, a substantially larger aircraft.  According to a 
company spokesman, “If Boeing is unable to secure sufficient time to prepare a 
competitive proposal, there is little option for Boeing other than to no-bid.” 31  Some 
observers concluded that Boeing’s ploy was intended to threaten a non-competitive 
source selection that Congress would not tolerate (Weber, 22 August 2008). 32 
Just as the Air Force backed down in early 2007 (when NG-EADS threatened 
a no-bid), the Department of Defense blinked in late 2008 (when Boeing threatened 
to withdraw from the competition).33  On September 10, 2008, The DoD announced a 
postponement to some unspecified time in 2009 (Cole & Lunsford, 2008). 
What the rivals will do in the interim has been discussed in the press.  Boeing 
might offer a larger version of the 767, while Airbus might offer a freighter (vs. 
                                            
30  Ibid. 
31 The Boeing 777 and Airbus A340 are significantly larger aircraft than the 767 and A330 currently in 
the game.  The Airbus A340 seems unlikely given that (a) there’s no A340 freighter readily available, 
and (b) the A340 has not competed well with the Boeing 777 in the commercial marketplace.  Good 
starting places for more information are the Wikipedia articles on the A340 and Boeing 777. 
32 From a Boeing perspective, this seems a reasonable position.  The firm had seriously considered 
offering a 777-based aerial tanker prior to the original competition, but had decided against it—a 
choice perhaps related to the no-credit provision for extra fuel offload capability in the original RFP.  
Wallace (2006). 
33 A caveat is in order.  We’re relying on press reports as foundation for this statement, which may or 
may not reflect the essential facts of the matter.  Hence, our characterization should be regarded as 
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passenger) version of the A330.  It’s also possible that Boeing would offer a 777-
based proposal and Airbus the A340 (Epstein, 2008). 
In any case, the KC-X program will experience yet another significant delay.  
Even if a new source selection is concluded in a timely manner, and even if that 
award survives a likely protest,34 nothing will happen until Congress appropriates the 
necessary funds.  And the Boeing supporters on Capitol Hill might well make strong 
efforts to prevent that—if NG-EADS wins the new competition.  What the NG-EADS 
Congressional supporters would do if Boeing wins the new competition is a matter 
for more speculation, but nonetheless a difficulty for the new tanker program if it’s a 
Boeing product.35 
Observations and Discussion 
As noted above, the facts regarding the KC-45 (KC-X) competition have not 
yet been made fully available to the public.  Accordingly, it’s best at this time to offer 
hypotheses as opposed to findings and conclusions.  However, we’re on secure 
grounds in concluding that the outcome of the KC-45 competition was not good for 
the nation, the Air Force, or any of the industrial participants.  There are a fair 
number of hypotheses that seem to fit the observable events, none of which are 
particularly encouraging.  Those hypotheses are posed below as a series of 
questions. 
Are Protests Inevitable?   
Defense aircraft purchases have devolved into very few numbers of new 
types awarded on a winner-take-all basis—with awards that are correspondingly 
very large and infrequent.  In the case of the KC-45, it’s likely that the next 
                                            
34  Appeals to the GAO are necessarily the end of the appeals options for losing bidders.  For 
example, the KC-135 support contract was overturned in federal court after GAO ruling against 
protests twice.  (Shalal-Esa, October 1, 2008). 
35 Congress is apparently ready to consider significant changes to the C-27/C-130H mix in tactical 
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opportunity to bid for a new aerial tanker will not come for at least 15 years.  It’s a 
high-stakes game, with potentially severe consequences for the losers.36 
Because the stakes are high, the award protest is accordingly appealing.  In 
this case, the protest has certainly bought sufficient time to fully mobilize Boeing’s 
political support.  Given the winner-take-all nature of the KC-45 competition, it’s fairly 
easy for the competition to become pure conflict (a zero-sum game).37  In short, 
there’s good reason to believe that losing-bidders’ protests will become a major 
feature of DoD competitions in the current environment.   
If so, the increasing numbers of bidding protests observed are more a 
symptom rather than the real problem.  There’s no reason, for example, to believe 
that making protests more difficult or risky (at least to any reasonable degree) will 
make protests sufficiently less attractive to be pursued significantly less often—given 
the stakes in the very large, winner-take-all contract awards.  Moreover, the 
perceived effects on the protester’s reputation are probably not significant either.  
Memories fade over the periods of time (decades) between contract awards in the 
various major system categories 
Is a Protest-Proof Source Selection Consistently Achieveable?38   
Boeing’s KC-45 protest took an involved exception to an  involved source 
selection process.  After extensive review, the GAO ruled in favor of Boeing.  In a 
                                            
36 This was also the case for the Joint Strike Fighter—awarded to Lockheed-Martin over Boeing—in 
2001.  It’s worth noting that there is no other tactical fighter purchase even on the horizon for the US 
DoD, with worries about the industrial base for fighters recently emerging as a major issue.  By 
contrast, when the US Air Force chose YF-16 (General Dynamics) over the YF-17 (Northrop) in the 
1970s, Northrop was able to team with McDonnell-Douglas and succeeded in selling the F-18 (a 
variant of the YF-17) to the US Navy and to international defense establishments.   
37 If sales were frequently made, it would generally be a better allocation of management attention 
and resources to take steps to increase chances of making the next sale.  However, if sales are 
separated by decades, then the best use of management resources changes significantly. 
38 The question is more precisely, but less briefly, posed using legal terminology as follows:  “Is it 
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July 2008 interview, Michael Wynne (former Secretary of the Air Force) opined that 
Boeing had, over the course of the competition, withheld information from the Air 
Force—probably to bolster a protest case should it lose the competition (Bennett, 
2008).  While Mr. Wynne’s statement is (as far as we know) not corroborated, it’s 
difficult to dismiss it as being implausible.  Suppose for the sake of argument that the 
award had gone to Boeing and that the NG-EADS team had protested.  Given the 
same set of facts about the Air Force conduct of the competition, could an NG-EADS 
protest have also been sustained?39  At this point, the question is clearly 
unanswerable, but we’re confident that “no” has not yet been established as a 
reasonable answer to the question.  It seems entirely possible that the GAO would, 
on similar grounds, have denied an award to Boeing —especially if the NG-EADS 
team had pursued the tactics that Wynne attributed to Boeing.  This would, of 
course, be an interesting question for more study—with sufficient resources and 
access. 
Should we rethink the bargaining strengths of the parties?   
The standard model of military contracts (at least up to the award decision) 
involves competing suppliers facing a sovereign monopsonist.  The facts of the 
matter in the case of the KC-45 were much different.  Instead of the government 
acting as a monopsonist,40 something more closely resembling a “quarrelsome 
committee” has been evident.  It appears that major military contracts have become 
yet another point of contention between the Executive and Legislative branches.  A 
Legislature that trusted the Executive to make sensible contract award decisions 
would likely not have instituted a means to protest (appeal) the original award and 
would likely not have designated a Congressionally-affiliated agency (i.e.,GAO) as 
something of an appellate court.   
                                            
39 This was, after all, a fairly close competition—given the terms of the RFP.  To continue our judicial 
analogy, could the GAO have found reversible errors had the result hypothetically gone in Boeing’s 
favor? 
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On the supply side, the bidders have exploited the committee’s divisions and 
also their small numbers.  The Legislature (one of the major members of the 
quarrelsome committee) insists upon competition (in part, due to distrusting the 
Executive) even when there are only two plausible bidders.  In that environment, 
both bidders have a great deal of market power with respect to the source selection 
agency—based simply on the threat not to respond with a bid to the government 
solicitation.  In early 2007, the NG-EADS team did precisely that and succeeded in 
changing the rules of the competition.  In the Summer of 2008, Boeing made the 
same threat and succeeded in getting the competition (writ large) indefinitely 
prolonged.41 
If the KC-45 competition does indeed reflect the state of the defense 
marketplace, then the standard theoretical models will need some major revisions. 
Tentative Recommendations 
It seems that there are both near-term and more persistent problems that 
should be addressed.  The near-term problem is to find a way to start recapitalizing 
the Air Force aerial tanker fleet.   
The Near-Term Problem 
The KC-45 competition, as currently structured, is essentially a zero-sum 
game between Boeing and NG-EADS—as well as their political supporters.  
Moreover, it appears that both sides have considerable power to block an 
unfavorable outcome.  It’s time to look for a win-win solution, which means 
restructuring the problem.  One classic means of finding the win-win outcome (or at 
                                            
41 The competition is expected to emerge from dormancy and be concluded in 2009.  Seems to us 
that’s not a sure thing.  The Republican candidate for President has strongly and publicly intervened 
against Boeing (the leasing initiative) and (probably) for NG-EADS, in early 2007.  The Democratic 
candidate has spoken out against loss of American jobs to foreign competition.  Regardless of the 
winner in November, it will be difficult for the Executive Branch to convince outside observers that a 
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least an acceptable compromise) is to expand the bargaining space and look for 
possibilities of side payments.  Here are two possibilities. 
Why not dual source?42  The Department of Defense (reflected recently in a 
statement by Secretary Gates) is strongly opposed to dual sourcing (Talbot, 2008).  
This is for the standard reasons: increased development costs, higher unit costs due 
to lower rates of production, more support and supply chains, higher training costs, 
etc.  However, the standard reasons are applicable only if proceeding with either the 
KC-767 or the KC-30 is a real possibility.  Moreover, the Secretary’s reasons do not 
factor in the incentives for both sides to be both efficient (and pass savings to the 
government) and innovative (with the government reaping benefits of increased 
quality and capability). 
The current DoD position might well reflect a failure of analysis—or 
imagination.  Given the circumstances discussed in this report, there’s very good 
reason to believe that proceeding with only one KC-X is not really an available 
course of action.  A more reasonable list of alternatives is (1) proceeding with a dual-
sourced “KC-X” and (2) living indefinitely with the existing fleet (KC-135s and KC-
10s).  Given that set of available alternatives, dual sourcing seems a very 
reasonable choice.43 
How about an out-of-court settlement?  The protest process (along with its 
political manifestations) has made the KC-45 more a matter of litigation than a 
standard source selection.  That suggests an out-of-court settlement that provides 
compensation (a side payment) to the losing bidder.  If the KC-30 is the chosen 
                                            
42 A possibility also raised recently by Rep. John Murtha (D, PA).  (Wallace, September 30, 2008) 
43 The “second-best” concept applies to public policy analysis.  The second best is a good choice 
when the first-best is not available.  In this case, the first-best courses of action (featuring one KC-X) 
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aircraft, then a side payment to Boeing might take the following form.  Retire the C-
5A’s44 and replace them one-for-one with C-17s procured with a multi-year contract.45 
If the KC-767 is chosen, then DoD could pursue buying (the yet undeveloped) 
Airbus A380 as a new airlifter.  In fact, there have been reports of Air Force inquiries 
into the A380 as a potential airlifter (Trimble, 2007). 
The Long-Term Problem 
Despite the KC-45 being the first priority for Air Force procurement, and 
despite aerial tankers being relatively uncomplicated devices (relative to fighters and 
bombers), the procurement process appears to be in a rather moribund state—with 
a timely conclusion being relatively problematic at present.  This is clearly a horrible 
outcome—like (say) an aircraft accident—and something to be carefully avoided in 
the future. 
As a matter for further study (when reasonably complete information is 
available) we recommend a forensic case study of the KC-45 competition.  The 
methodology we propose would more closely resemble a safety (or accident) 
investigation board than a standard business school case study.  The intent would 
be to (a) determine exactly what happened (a detailed set of findings), (b) why it 
happened (causal factors, perhaps a complex set), and (c) what to do about it 
(recommendations). 
This seems well worth doing, because (among other things) the public 
discussion of the KC-45 affair has been simplistic at best: blaming Boeing for a lousy 
proposal (not true), and then the Air Force for conducting a lousy competition 
                                            
44 This would likely entail curtailing or cancelling C-5A upgrades. 
45 While a C-17 has less cargo capacity than a C-5, C-17 availability rates would be significantly 
higher and the Air Force would also receive a number of KC-30s, which the service has touted as 
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(perhaps true).46  There’s been a rather unproductive discussion of domestic jobs in 
a global environment (and in which KC-30 manufacture would have extensive US 
participation).  In fact, there is good reason to believe that the bad results now 
evident in the KC-45 competition might well be the product of multiple causes and 
(conceivably) systemic failures.  In that context, it’s possible that a detailed study of 
the KC-45 competition might well shed useful light on problems with the US defense 
acquisition system (in all its aspects), and—more importantly—indicate ways to 
improve it. 
                                            
46 It’s easy to focus on “pilot error” in assigning causes to aircraft accidents.  If pilots performed 
perfectly at all times, there would be very few accidents (despite failures and hazards present).  But 
it’s also useful to focus on shaping the operating environment (within reason) to (1) make pilots less 
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Section IV. Foreign Direct Investment in US 
Defense Industries 
Background47 
This section is designed as a preliminary overview of efforts of foreign firms, 
principally European, to penetrate the US defense market.  The dominance of US 
defense firms is seen in the recent DefenseNews table of the top 100 defense 
suppliers, world wide (Boessenkool, 2008).  Seven of the top 10 are American 
establishments, which, together with the remaining 36, are distributed among every 
decile of the table.  Nevertheless, the 3 non-American firms among the top 10, 
EADS, Finmeccanica, and BAE, have been quite successful in selling to the US 
defense sector, and they have been selected as case studies.  Confidential 
interviews with high level, Washington-based officials were conducted in the spring 
of 2008 and the highlights of these meetings appear below.  Since their experiences 
were constrained by US laws and regulations dealing with foreign suppliers of 
defense goods, it was deemed useful to provide readers with a brief review of such 
rules. 
US history is replete with debates concerning the extent to which foreign 
ownership and/or control of domestic productive assets constitutes a risk to national 
security.  The outbreak of World War I gave new impetus to the issue and after the 
entry of the US into the conflict in 1917, the Trading With the Enemy Act was 
passed.  Essentially, it gave the President the authority to seize foreign-owned 
assets.   President Woodrow Wilson employed the act in 1917 and 1918 to seize 
almost all US assets owned by German companies in addition to assets owned by 
US citizens of German origin.  The most important of these assets were in the 
chemical industry, then viewed as being of strategic importance.  Of particular 
                                            
47 Much of this material comes from the excellent study of Graham and Marchick (2006), Chapters 1 
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interest is the fact that the US government later sold or otherwise transferred such 
assets (including patents) to firms such as DuPont and General Electric.  A number 
of other subsequently important American firms began their growth during the post-
war years of the 1920s as a consequence of such transfers of intellectual property.  
Following the war’s end, Congress, largely at the urging of the US Navy, enacted 
several sector-specific prohibitions on foreign direct investment (FDI) in fields 
deemed strategic such as radio broadcasting, telecommunications, air transport, 
shipping, and oil.  
President Franklin D. Roosevelt resorted to the same law (TWTE) in 1941, 
again against enemy-held assets despite the fact that the number of such assets 
then available in the US was quite small.  In the case of Germany, Graham and 
Marchick (2006) attribute this fact to the poor economic health of Germany during 
the interwar years and fear among German investors about the security of their 
investments in the US after the World War I experience.   Most enemy-held assets 
were concentrated in the electrical, pharmaceutical, and chemical sectors.  Of 
interest is the fact that during World War II, the US antitrust laws played a key role in 
the campaign against foreign company investments in the US.  In large measure, 
this reflected their activities with cartel partners in this country.  Foreign direct 
investment in the US grew slowly during the war and by 1946 reached $2.5 billion 
with much of it coming from the UK and Canada.  Spurred by European economic 
recovery during the next several decades, however, between 1956 and 1977, the 
growth rate increased noticeably at an annual compound rate of approximately 
13.5%.    During the 1985 -2005 interval, foreign direct investment grew more than 8 
times from roughly $185 billion to nearly $1.7 trillion.  Such rapid growth has been 
accompanied in some quarters by heightened anxiety over possible national security 
vulnerability.48 
                                            
48 Curiously, the rate of growth of US FDI abroad so far outdistanced the reverse flow during  the first 
two postwar decades  that a well-known French author, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, cautioned 
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In 1977, Congress had amended the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 
through passage of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act that imposed 
some limitations on the President’s authority to seize and assume title to foreign-
owned assets in the US.  The amendment required the President to declare an 
international emergency according to procedures specified under the National 
Emergencies Act of 1976 in order to invoke the powers of the Trading With the 
Enemy Act.  The Amendment also specified that while the President could seize 
foreign-owned assets in the US during a declared national emergency, he could not 
take title since ownership of such assets would remain in the hands of foreign 
investors with control over them likely to be returned at the conclusion of such 
emergency.  Aside from the change in the rule concerning the taking of title, the 
remainder of the Trading With the Enemy Act remained largely unchanged. 
Over the years, debate continued over the net effects of FDI in the US.  In the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, administration statements were issued on the subject.  
A formal policy statement by President Jimmy Carter in 1977 advocated a policy of 
neutrality concerning FDI into the US and US FDI abroad.  At about the same time, 
there was growing concern over the expanding stock of petrodollars accumulating as 
a result of widely publicized increases in the price of oil by the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1974 and 1977.  Alarmists worried that 
such wealth could lead to the acquisition by OPEC states of important US assets.  
Congressional hearings in 1979, however, suggested that most FDI in the US was 
coming from Europe, which served to quiet such fears. 
In 1977, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Powers Act, which, as 
noted above, amended the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, but such changes 
could hardly be seen as tightening regulation of FDI in the US.  A  Reagan 
administration policy statement issued in 1983 retained the Carter position but 
welcomed foreign direct investment that appeared in response to market forces. 
The year 1985 saw the start of an international expansion in FDI, reflecting in 
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to 2004, the stock of FDI in the US grew more than eight times from approximately 
$185 billion to just under $1.5 trillion.  This increase translates into an annual 
compound growth rate of about 11% over the period.  What is often ignored is that 
this phenomenon was not an isolated event and was slightly slower than the global 
rate of growth.  The growth rate in the US actually slowed after 1985, and in the 
early years of the 21st century, the growth of US outgoing direct investment 
exceeded the inflow.  By late 2004, the stock of US direct investment abroad was 
about 1/3 greater than the stock of FDI in the US. 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, FDI had become a major and public 
source of dispute in the American media and Congress.  National security concerns 
dominated the debate and were highlighted in numerous books, articles, and even 
films.  At the time, fear of technology loss to Japan via the purchase of US firms by 
Japanese firms was high.  In fact, the feared technology loss to Japan did not occur, 
and the US technological lead grew, largely as a result of the explosion in the 
information technology-based sector.  However, the facts rarely overtake the bold 
headlines and the 2-minute shocking news clips on television. 
Graham and Marchick (2006) hypothesize that by the 1970s, the names of 
large foreign firms investing in the US such as Shell, Lever Brothers, and Philips 
Norelco had become familiar in the American marketplace, and with their English 
names, were often taken by consumers as domestically owned and operated.   By 
the 1980s, however, this situation had changed and there was easy recognition of 
the foreign names of new investors, particularly from Asia. 
This brief historical review reveals that restrictions on FDI in the US have 
usually occurred in periods of war or other insecurity.  Fear of growing Japanese 
dominance of the American high technology sector and two widely publicized 
attempted corporate takeovers in the late 1980s prepared the way for new 
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The Exon-Florio Amendment 
Concern in Congress had been building over increased FDI in the US through 
the 1980s and it reached a boiling point over two well-publicized takeover attempts:  
one was the move by Sir James Goldsmith, a famous British corporate raider, to 
absorb Goodyear Tire and Rubber; the other was an attempt by Fujitsu of Japan to 
gain an 80% interest in Fairchild, then a large California semiconductor producer.  
Proposed legislation to block the Fujitsu offer alarmed the Reagan administration 
that foresaw such action as discouraging foreign investment in general and 
frustrating its efforts to open the Japanese market to US goods.  To ameliorate 
Congressional pressure, it had the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US 
(CFIUS) undertake a review into possible security risks associated with the Fairchild 
deal.  CFIUS had been created by Executive Order in 1975 to review any investment 
which might affect the national interests of the US but it was then only a Presidential 
advisory organization without authority to undertake substantive actions. 
To assuage Congressional unhappiness, the Reagan administration went a 
step further by having the Justice Department review the proposed transaction under 
the terms of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976, which amended the antitrust laws, 
principally the Clayton Act, by establishing criteria to be used in the evaluation of 
proposed mergers.  Even though the administration was unlikely to prohibit the 
merger, Fujitsu retracted the offer to Fairchild with the rationale that “rising political 
controversy in the United States” made proceeding with the deal undesirable 
(Alvarez, 1989, p. 62). 
Dissatisfaction with the administration’s handling of the Fujitsu-Fairchild case 
was widespread and Senator James Exon (D-NE) introduced a bill giving the 
President “discretionary authority to review” and take action against “foreign 
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threatening the national security or “essential commerce of the United States.”49  
This legislation would provide the President with an alternative to the IEEPA, which 
required him to declare a national emergency to take action against such threats.  
Congressman James Florio (D-NJ) introduced a similar bill into the House of 
Representatives.50   
The proposed Exon amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1950 
encountered significant opposition on grounds that it could block foreign investment 
that did not threaten national security.  Opponents also objected to the “essential 
commerce” provision, the addition of economic factors among criteria for judging a 
proposed transaction, and the inclusion of joint ventures and licensing arrangements 
among proposed transactions for review. 
After removal of such objectionable sections including deletion of the 
Secretary of Commerce from the lead role in administering the act, it was finally 
passed as an amendment to Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 via 
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.  The act authorized the 
President to investigate foreign acquisitions, mergers, takeovers of, or investments 
in US companies from the viewpoint of national security.  The President was also 
authorized by the amendment to bloc an acquisition if “there is credible evidence 
that leads the President to believe that the foreign interest exercising control might 
take an action that threatens to impair the national security” and if, in the President’s 
judgment, no other laws provide adequate authority for the protection of the national 
security in this case.51 
After the passage of the Exon-Florio amendments, the President transferred 
his initial review and decision-making authority to CFIUS, now chaired by the 
                                            
49 “Statement of Senator Exon, Foreign Investment, National Security and Essential Commerce Act of 1987”, HR 3, 10
Congress, 1st Sess. (1987), as cited in Graham and Marchick, op. cit., p.41.   
50 Graham and Marchick, ibid., p. 42. 
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Secretary of the Treasury.  CFIUS is composed of the Secretaries of Treasury, 
State, Defense, Commerce, Attorney General, Director of the Office of Management 
and Budget, United States Trade Representative, Chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisers, Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Assistant to the President for 
Economic Policy, and since 9/11, Secretary of Homeland Security.  CFIUS is 
authorized to review a transaction filed voluntarily by either party to the transaction 
or after receipt of an agency notice from one of the committee’s members. 
The law also provides a timetable for CFIUS reviews:  a 30-day review 
following directly upon receipt of a notice; an investigation interval of 45 days for 
complex proposals requiring extra time beyond the initial 30-day review; a formal 
report to the President at the conclusion of the 45-day interval, and a presidential 
decision no later than 15 days after receipt of the formal report.   
In several important areas, however, the statute provides CFIUS with broad 
discretion.  Thus, there is no statute of limitations governing committee authority—it 
is not time-limited.  An investigation can be undertaken despite the prior closure of a 
transaction. Despite the importance of national security in the wording of the act, that 
term is never defined, although several criteria are identified for possible use in 
evaluation of a potential threat.  Even here, the committee can go beyond such 
criteria. On occasion, the committee has reviewed industries outside the narrowly-
defined defense sector. 
“Foreign control” as used in the act has been variously interpreted.  Similarly, 
the term “credible evidence” has not been narrowly defined.   All these facts suggest 
that CFIUS has considerable leeway in deciding whether a proposed transaction’s 
impact on national security is adequate to warrant a formal inquiry, and, if so, 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 48 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Congressional Attempts to Amend Exon-Florio 
Since the passage of the Exon-Florio Amendment52 there have been many 
attempts in Congress to make the law more restrictive.  These are reviewed in detail 
by Graham and Marchick.  Such attempts have focused repeatedly on several 
general areas:  economic interests as a CFIUS review factor, the departmental 
identity of the committee chairmanship, issues of technology transfer, strengthened 
monitoring, and much expanded Congressional involvement in the administration of 
the act.  Proposals for stronger “buy American” limitations on the DoD’s authority to 
buy abroad have become widely associated with the names of Congressmen Hunter 
Douglas (D-CA) and John Murtha (D-PA.).  With one exception, such attempts have 
failed.  That exception became the Byrd amendment of 1992 to Exon-Florio. 
Once again, a highly publicized transaction aroused widespread public and 
Congressional concern.  In this case, it revolved around a 1992 attempt by the 
French defense firm Thomson-CSF to buy a controlling interest in the American 
company LTV Aerospace and Defense Corporation, an international leader in 
missile technology.  To make matters worse, the French government owned 60% of 
Thomson’s shares and controlled 75% of its voting stock.  The controversy 
surrounding what some saw as an attempt by France to obtain control of an 
important US defense firm resulted in passage of the Byrd amendment, which most 
importantly,  requires investigation of any attempt by a foreign firm essentially owned 
or controlled by a foreign government to acquire an American firm.  The goal, of 
course, was to prevent the loss of essential US technology to a foreign government.   
Congressional criticism of CFIUS operations has continued, usually sparked 
by some potentially disturbing transaction.  In the post 9/11 environment, such 
criticism has grown more frequent and heated.  In mid-2005, the Chinese firm 
                                            
52 This section describes the situation as it existed from the passage of the Exon-Florio Amendment in 
1988 until adoption of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act in October 2007.  The 
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Lenovo succeeded in purchasing the personal computer division of IBM.  This was 
no mean accomplishment given the fact that an economically resurgent China had 
replaced Japan as a seemingly all-powerful economic competitor in the media and 
on Capital Hill and after the Chinese National Overseas Oil Company (CNOOC) had 
felt obliged to abandon its plan to purchase California-based UNOCAL due to 
political opposition in the US. 
This outcome was very similar to the end of the effort of Dubai Ports World, a 
company owned and controlled by the government of the United Arab Emirates to 
take over the management of five US ports, previously run by the British firm, 
Peninsular And Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O).53   
Opponents of CFIUS in the Congress were strengthened by a critical report 
on CFIUS by the Government Accountability Office released in late September of 
2005. 
The main criticisms focused on several points:  that Treasury and other 
agencies take a much too narrow perspective on the definition of national security;  
that CFIUS is hesitant to open investigations for fear that they would chill foreign 
investment in the US;  that the 30-day time limit for the review of proposed foreign 
acquisitions of US firms is inadequate to permit a detailed study of their national 
security consequences;  and that the CFIUS member agencies do not agree on the 
criteria for determining whether a broader investigation is appropriate (GAO, 2005).54  
During the controversy concerning the Dubai Ports World-P&O case, 
members of Congress were prodigious in drafting new bills to regulate foreign direct 
investment—more than 20 were introduced and designed to prevent approval of this 
particular acquisition, to prevent foreign ownership of essential port operations, or to 
                                            
53 The rather shocking details of how the facts in this case were twisted to make it a “national security” 
matter are related in Graham and Marchick, op. cit., pp.136-139. 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 50 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
otherwise amend Exon-Florio.  A review of the cases named above indicates the 
growing politicization of the Exon-Florio procedure. 
To recognize this trend is not to suggest that Exon-Florio should be 
considered beyond improvement based upon experience under its terms.  Indeed, 
Graham and Marchick (2006) offer several suggestions to improve its operations: 
adding protection of critical infrastructure as a factor for CFIUS consideration; 
establishing security standards for employment of foreigners in sensitive positions;  
enhancing disclosure of information to Congress;  clarifying the standard by which 
CFIUS determines whether there is “foreign” control;  and developing international 
standards for national security review processes (pp. xxi-xxii).  
Exon-Florio is not the only means available to the US government to regulate 
foreign investment in the defense sector.  Perhaps less well-known but not 
insignificant are the terms included in the Pentagon’s National Industrial Security 
Program Operating Manual (NISPOM).  Created by an executive order in 1995 and 
subsequently amended in 1997 and 2001, its rules require all DoD contractors to 
have a facility clearance in order to possess access to classified material or to 
receive a contract to work with classified materials.  Criteria are established to 
ascertain if US firms that have been cleared or are under consideration for a facility 
clearance are under “foreign ownership, control, or influence” (FOCI).  Interestingly, 
none of these criteria are adequate by themselves in determining FOCI but they 
must be evaluated in the aggregate.  Its establishment of a 5% level of foreign 
ownership of voting stock as adequate for concern is more demanding than the 
corresponding CFIUS level.  In general, the NISPOM test for foreign control is 
broader with far more transactions eligible for consideration than CFIUS regulations 
(p.160).  
Procedures under NISPOM and CFIUS are not dissimilar however.  For 
example, receipt of a voluntary notice by CFIUS of a proposed transaction in which 
foreign investment in the US defense sector is involved triggers a course of action 
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National Defense Authorization Act requires the Defense Department to ascertain if 
the unit being acquired maintains possession of critical defense technology under 
development or can otherwise be determined to be important to the defense 
industrial base.  If either situation prevails, the DoD is obliged to assess any 
associated risk of technology loss, which is then distributed to other CFIUS 
members.   
If such risk is deemed by DoD to be capable of being mitigated, however, it 
may negotiate protective measures with the parties to the acquisition.  Typically, 
such steps fall into several categories depending on the order of restrictiveness 
viewed as necessary to prevent unauthorized technology transfer.  Four general 
categories follow: 
Board Resolution—Where there is only limited foreign ownership and control, 
a board resolution may be used to the effect that the foreign shareholder will not 
obtain voting stock adequate to elect members of the board or otherwise obtain 
board representation. 
Limited Facility Clearance—Such a clearance permits the foreign party 
access to classified material which is limited to that necessary to perform on a 
contract involving the parent government with which the US government has 
reached an industrial security agreement. 
Special Security Agreement (SSA) and Security Control Agreement (SCA) —
Both these agreement forms require the creation of a subsidiary in which limited 
participation by the foreign owner is permitted.  Typically, such owner sits on a 
board, a majority of whose members are US citizens, cleared by DoD, with no ties to 
the foreign investors. 
Voting Trust Agreement and Proxy Agreement—Under these two similar 
Agreements, a foreign investor is obliged to form a separate subsidiary for 
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shareholders are required to abandon any rights to control, influence or direct 
activities or provide strategic direction of the subsidiary.  Such typical share-holder 
rights are vested in the hands of American members of the board, all of whom must 
be citizens who are qualified for security clearances.  Further, their selection is 
subject to DoD approval. (pp.71-72) 
Typically, DoD plays the major role in reaching terms designed to mitigate 
possible negative effects of foreign control and influence.  CFIUS approval of such 
an acquisition of a US firm requires prior DoD endorsement.  Often, foreign 
companies desirous of acquiring a US defense firm are familiar with the CFIUS 
process and the Pentagon’s rules from previous experience and may confer 
informally with regulatory authorities in advance of submitting a formal application.  
Also, under certain circumstances, well-known and trusted foreign defense firms can 
arrange to receive a blanket special security agreement saving the need to negotiate 
each new case from scratch.  
Evidence suggests that a partial liberalization of controls over foreign direct 
investment in the US defense sector may have occurred in the late 1990s, but 
pressures for a reversal of such a development have been building since the events 
of 9/11 (p. 73).  A number of bills were drafted in the Congress during 2006 of a 
rather extreme nature but none were adopted.   Finally, in October 2007, Congress 
passed the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA).55  
The following details of FINSA are taken from GovTrack.us (2007). FINSA 
amended the Defense Production Act of 1950, revising sections dealing with the 
authority of the President to review certain mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers and 
requiring the President, through CFIUS, upon receiving formal notification from any 
parties to such mergers, etc., proposed or pending after August 23, 1988, which 
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might lead to foreign control of any person engaged in a covered transaction, to 
undertake a review in order to determine its effects on national security. 
The President or CFIUS is authorized to investigate any covered transaction, 
including those previously reviewed if there is reason to believe that any party 
submitted false or misleading information or, if any party intentionally breaches in a 
material way —a mitigation agreement or condition previously imposed upon the 
transaction. 
CFIUS is required to undertake an immediate inquiry into the effects on 
national security of certain covered transactions: (1) if it concludes that a threat to 
national security exists and has not been mitigated, or the transaction is foreign 
government-controlled; (2) the transaction would lead to control of any US critical 
infrastructure by a foreign person that would impair national security without proper 
mitigation; or (3) the lead agency for each covered transaction recommends, with 
CFIUS concurrence, that an investigation be undertaken.  Such inquiry must be 
completed within 45 days. Investigations of foreign government-controlled 
transactions, or those involving critical infrastructure will not be required if the 
Treasury Secretary and the head of the lead agency jointly conclude that the 
transaction will not harm national security.   
The Act further requires the chair of CFIUS: (1) to publish in the Federal 
Register guidance on the transaction types that CFIUS has considered to raise 
national security considerations; and (2) and the head of the lead agency to transmit 
a certified notice and written report covering each investigation of a covered 
transaction to specified members of Congress.  The Director of National Intelligence 
is also required to conduct an analysis of any threat to national security associated 
with a covered transaction. 
CFIUS, which previously has operated under the authority of an Executive 
Order, is converted into a multi-agency statutory committee with a revised 
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Office of Management and Budget, the US Trade Representative, the Chair of the 
Council of Economic Advisers, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy, and the Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, and 
Economic Policy.  These officials are no longer named, but the Act recognizes the 
authority of the President to designate the heads of other executive agencies as may 
be deemed desirable.  Of interest is the specific addition of the Secretaries of 
Energy and of Labor and the Director of National Intelligence.   
Further, an additional post of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury has been 
established to conduct CFIUS-related duties.  In addition, the Treasury Secretary will 
be required to designate CFIUS member(s) to act as lead agency(ies) to deal with 
covered transactions. 
Additional factors have been specified for the President to consider in 
evaluating covered transactions.  These include whether the proposed transaction: 
(1) has national security-related consequences on US critical technologies; and (2) 
is a foreign government-controlled transaction. 
The act authorizes CFIUS or a lead agency to reach agreements with parties 
to a covered transaction to mitigate any threat to national security.  The lead agency 
may negotiate, modify, monitor, and enforce such agreements and must submit 
periodic reports to CFIUS on implementation of such agreements. 
The President is authorized to suspend or prohibit any covered transaction 
threatening to harm national security and is required to consider specified factors in 
deciding to suspend or prohibit a covered transaction. 
The Act requires CFIUS (1) upon request, to brief certain members of 
Congress of covered transactions for which action has concluded; and (2) to submit 
annual reports to Congress after such completed inquiries. CFIUS is also required to 
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research, development, or production of critical technologies, as well as possible 
industrial espionage. 
The Secretary of the Treasury is required to (1) annually study foreign direct 
investment in the US, especially in critical infrastructure and in industries affecting 
national security by foreign governments (or their agents) that comply with any 
boycott of Israel or do not ban terrorist groups; and (2) report each study’s results to 
Congress.  The Act directs the Inspector General of the Treasury to conduct 
investigations of any failure by Treasury to deliver any report required by CFIUS, 
and to report such investigation results to appropriate Congressional committees. 
Despite the surface appearance of a significant tightening in the procedures 
governing FDI in the US, informal comments by Treasury Department officials 
suggest that changes will be modest as the act essentially codified practices that 
were already largely being followed.  With respect to the changes in the membership 
of CFIUS, as noted above, the President retains the authority to name members to 
serve from his Executive departments as he sees fit. In addition, apparently some of 
the new members will serve in an ex-officio capacity with limited authority, to ensure 
that focus remains on issues of national security.  Increasing the flow of information 
to Congress enhances transparency, which was one of the recommendations by 
Graham and Marchick (2006, pp. 152-156).   
After the foregoing review of the legislative and regulatory background, we 
shall now present three case studies of European firms that have been quite 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 56 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Three Cases56 
European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) 
EADS is Europe’s largest aerospace company and, worldwide, ranks second 
behind Boeing.  Its operations focus on civil and military aircraft, space, defense 
systems, and assorted services.  The company emerged in July 2000 from the 
merger of the activities of DaimlerChrysler Aerospace (DASA) of Germany, 
Aerospatiale Matra of France, and Construcciones Aeronauticas S.A. (CASA) of 
Spain. Its statutory headquarters is located in the Netherlands (which causes 
confusion on lists that identify its nationality as Dutch), but its actual headquarters 
are divided between Paris and Munich.  For much of its early life, British Aerospace 
Systems (BAe) was a fourth partner, but it sold its interests back to EADS in 2006.   
For some 30 years earlier, Airbus passenger aircraft were produced in a consortium 
arrangement in which the partners retained ownership of engineering and production 
assets leaving Airbus Industrie,  per se, largely as an organization devoted to sales 
and marketing.  Corporate integration was first proposed in 1989, but was 
unsuccessful with both governments and firms reluctant to surrender control of their 
aerospace and defense industries.  By the years 2000 and 2001, however, a 
European wave of aerospace consolidation became irresistible and the modern 
structure of the company emerged. 
EADS ranked seventh, worldwide, in its defense revenues in 2007 of $12.2 
billion.  This represented 21.3% of its total revenues that year of $57.6 billion.  This 
level of defense dependency was next to the bottom of the top 10 producers, largely 
reflecting the importance of its Airbus market.   
EADS’ ownership of Airbus has provided much of its profits but also made it 
vulnerable to fluctuations in the market for civil aircraft.  As a consequence, EADS’ 
                                            
56 Valuable contextual information on these three firms is taken from the excellent study by Vlachos-
Dengler (2004).  At this point we acknowledge a significant debt that’s insufficiently documented in 
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management determined to increase its presence in military and related markets 
and, given the relatively low defense budgets of most European countries, the US 
defense market became an obvious target.   Apparently, its top management has 
concluded that building an industrial presence in the US is necessary to encourage 
serious interest in its products by American procurement officials.  A recent example 
of this strategy was illustrated by EADS’ acquisition in April of 2008 of PlantCML, a 
California provider of emergency-response systems.  Louis Gallois, chief executive 
of EADS, noted that the acquisition would strengthen the company’s position in 
security systems and, hence, expand its industrial presence in North America 
(Pearson, 2008, p. B8).  
EADS North America’s activities fall into six lines of business: aerial refueling 
tankers, rotorcraft, transport and mission aircraft, defense electronics and systems, 
test and services, and space.    
EADS’ strategy has been to use joint ventures and niche products and 
technologies to attain entree into the US defense market.  It has developed close 
relations with Northrop Grumman in several different sectors, the most important of 
which is probably their joint effort to win a US Air Force contract to begin the 
replacement of aging tanker refueling aircraft, a high priority goal of the US Air 
Force. 
Our meeting with EADS-North America officials occurred in the spring of 
2008, just prior to the initial Air Force decision to award the contract to the EADS-
Northrop Grumman partnership.   Hence, much of the conversation focused on that 
project. 
Our respondents began by noting that EADS had brought  an established 
commercial aircraft, the A-330, to the competition, well certified and, off the shelf, as 
it were, yet more modern and superior to the Boeing 767 entry.  They believe that 
the heart of the USAF decision to compete the project grew out of a leasing scandal 
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competition.  They stressed that there is a widespread under-appreciation of the 
level of competition likely to evolve in a duopoly situation in which such 
considerations as price and meeting delivery dates are at issue. 
Returning to a specific comparison, our respondents stressed that the Boeing 
entry has never been flown or tested for the tanker mission.  It would be a 
redesigned 767 with new wings, landing gear, cockpit, control surfaces, and 
engine—all taken from other aircraft.  It has been likened to a Frankenstein creation, 
like putting a digital cockpit on an analogue plane.57 
It was stressed that no new commercial 767’s have been sold since 2002 and 
that the new version will have no established history.  In contrast, Airbus has been 
receiving new orders for its A-330 every week. Further, EADS is offering a tested, 
more modern plane, equipped with a fly-by-wire system.  It was claimed that the A-
330 refueling system is superior with a bigger envelope for its boom and a faster and 
safer performance in offloading fuel.  Our respondent explained that this results from 
the fact that fuel storage in the EADS tanker will be located in facilities in the wings 
and tail, while the Boeing tanker will use fuel bladders for storage.  In addition to 
these qualities are the Airbus’s capacity to carry more cargo and troops.  It was 
pointed out that in a wartime scenario, use of the EADS–Northrop product would 
permit the use of fewer aircraft to accomplish the same mission.  It was also noted 
that in the respondents’ opinion, their aircraft represented a tested product versus an 
untested new design, it was a superior product, already being produced on a robust 
production line, and already flying.  We were also informed that EADS has won the 
last five international competitions with Boeing, and that Boeing’s 767-based tanker 
has only been selected (and in small numbers at that) by Italy and Japan.  Both 
customers are apparently unhappy with the results, with the Italian Air Force furious 
                                            
57 At least from an EADS perspective.  On balance, we believe this to be negative campaigning by 
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at the repeated delays.58  It should be noted that the Boeing tankers sold to these 
two countries are not the same aircraft that Boeing has offered to the USAF in the 
competition with EADS but an earlier version. 
An issue that has been repeatedly raised as an advantage of the Boeing entry 
is its smaller size, which is assumed to mean that it could more easily operate from 
rougher fields with shorter runways.   The EADS response has been based on two 
points, one technical and the other operational.  The technical point is based on a 
comparison of the length of runway needed for each aircraft to takeoff in a fully 
loaded configuration.  Our EADS respondent maintained that the EADS tanker (A-
330 based) can operate from a 7,000-foot runway in comparison with the Boeing 
(767 derived) tanker which would require an 8,000-foot runway.  He explained this 
seemingly counterintuitive fact by emphasizing that the wing spread and engine 
power were more important determinants of runway requirements than size of 
aircraft.  In his view, size related more to available ramp space for loading, while 
conceding that his aircraft would probably require a different system of operations 
than the present one.  On the operational side, he stressed that while refueling other 
aircraft while airborne, tankers (as well as their “customers”) were in a highly 
vulnerable position since they fly flat in a straight line and at a constant speed.  
Hence, they rarely fly unaccompanied by airborne warning and control aircraft and 
fighter aircraft, which are charged with protecting the tankers.  They are viewed as 
too valuable an investment to fly near areas of fighting, so the ability to land on 
rough fields with short runways is not seen as a significant advantage.  Another 
related consideration is the fact that such aircraft require very large fuel storage 
facilities at bases from which they operate and these are located only at major 
military air bases or very large commercial airports.   
EADS plans to build the tanker in an assembly facility located in Mobile, 
Alabama, which they noted would be the first new such facility built in the US in four 
                                            




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 60 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
decades.  Apparently, the decision has also been made to build A-330 commercial 
freighter aircraft in the same facility.  They foresee major economic growth in the 
region, reasoning that aircraft parts suppliers of all kinds will be drawn by the EADS-
Northrop facility.  They also expect dramatic improvements in the broad educational 
environment in the area, having already contacted the University of South Alabama 
about new and/or expanded programs designed to help provide training for potential 
employees.  If successful, such programs would not only be useful to EADS but also 
beneficial to the entire region in developing a more capable labor force to attract 
additional industrial development.  EADS also plans to produce the boom in the 
Mobile facility, while the hose and drogue will be provided by Sargent-Fletcher (a 
subsidiary of the Cobham company of the UK) at its Bridgeport, West Virginia, plant.  
EADS also anticipates constructing a facility near the Sargent-Fletcher operation to 
complete the boom assembly. 
Our respondents noted that EADS’ CEO has declared a strategy to expand its 
footprint in the US, even independent of the final tanker decision, since “it’s just good 
business”.  The boardroom belief is that since they are buying so much from the US, 
it makes sense to create a diversified portfolio here.  In subsequent conversations 
with an EADS spokesman, the question was raised whether the EADS decision to 
locate non-tanker work in the US was, in fact, independent of their prior success in 
winning the USAF tanker competition.  We were informed that such an interpretation 
was incorrect.  The printed evidence on the subject is mixed.  An article in the 
Seattle Post-Intelligencer in November 2007 noted that as part of its drive to “put an 
American face” on its bid for the tanker contract, EADS had teamed with Northrop-
Grumman and had “promised to build a new factory in Mobile, ALA., if it wins ” 
(Rosenberg, 2007).  Several other news stories, however, cast doubt on the 
independence of the two decisions.  In particular, reporting on an interview with 
EADS’ CEO, Louis Gallois, at the Farnborough Air Show in the summer of 2008, a 
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As EADS becomes more global, defense is a crucial sector for the company.  
And with European defense budgets remaining mostly stagnant, that means 
the company must do more business  in the US.  Because of that, Mr.Gallois 
says, EADS and Airbus’s plans for an assembly line in Mobile, Ala. don’t 
hinge on their getting the tanker contract.(Wingfield, 2008, p. A9.) 
Whichever interpretation is correct, shortly after the GAO report supporting 
Boeing’s complaint that the USAF failed to follow proper procedures in awarding the 
contract to the Northrop-EADS team, the planned groundbreaking ceremonies 
scheduled for Mobile were cancelled.   
Perhaps more important than this issue of conditionality is the matter of 
domestic content.  Students of the “offset” phenomenon in defense trade would 
probably use this term to characterize the above debate.  When posed with this 
question of definition, an EADS official responded that “You can call it offsets if you 
like” and then after hinting that the issue might be dismissed as mere semantics, 
went on to indicate why domestic content was part of the EADS business plan for 
locating manufacturing and assembly work in the US.  He identified three reasons: 
 They believe that the US taxpayer has the right to expect a domestic 
return for his government’s decision to purchase a foreign product.  
 EADS benefits because of the Euro-dollar exchange rate.  
 A political factor is present since the product purchased from abroad 
must contain 51% American content.  Beyond that, however, to 
support the project long term, they need a political as well as an 
industrial presence in the US. 
The partnership details with Northrop-Grumman have been carefully prepared 
to meet national security regulations concerning foreign firms working on US 
defense projects in this country.  Northrop will be responsible for integrating all 
electronic warfare systems, military avionics, and modifying all refueling sets.  Its 
facilities will be collocated in Mobile and, as it was put, the security firewall would be 
constituted by the runway.    US technology would be carefully protected with even 
strict limits on what the engineers from the two partners could discuss.  Checks and 
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enforced, and we were assured that EADS’ personnel were quite familiar from their 
work in other countries with similar regulations that were described as quite 
commonplace now.  When Special Security Agreements have been reached they 
will establish boundaries limiting access by non-citizens to secure areas.  Part of the 
company’s Board of Directors will consist of US citizens, and foreign owners will be 
largely limited to receiving profit payments, without any access to critical 
technologies.  Thus, EADS-North America will be a US-based independent 
operation, functioning under an independent oversight board.    
Finally, it was stressed that globalization has advanced much further than 
even informed citizens are aware, and that such concepts as the nationality of a 
product are quite imprecise.   It was pointed out, for example, that US sources are 
the largest contributors of parts for the Airbus A-330, and that while Boeing is not 
among such suppliers, EADS and Boeing share many suppliers.  In the above cited 
interview, EADS CEO Louis Gallois argued that EADS’ “purely European” identity is 
no more.  He insisted that “We are not European, […] we are becoming global.  As 
they [Boeing] are global.  Because their [tanker] has parts made in Japan, in China, 
in Korea, in Italy…Their airplane is global, our airplane is global, and we are living in 
that world…And I think Boeing could understand that”(Wingfield, 2008, p. A9).  
That level of sophistication is rare in the ongoing debate.  Senators Patty 
Murray and Maria Cantwell of Washington have argued strongly that the EADS-
Northrop entry in the tanker competition is a “foreign” aircraft.  In Murray’s words, 
“Airbus has shown its true colors time and again, and they’re anything but red, white, 
and blue” (Mundy, 2005).59  At the time of this writing, Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates had dropped plans to select one of the two tanker proposals during the 
remainder of the Bush presidency.   
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Finmeccanica/Alenia 
The Finmeccanica group is Italy’s largest, and in 2007 ranked as Europe’s 
third largest defense company with revenues from defense activities of $10.6 billion.  
This compares with $3.9 billion in 2002, a growth of 2.7 times in 5 years.  (The 
figures are in current dollars).  While its rank, worldwide, remained unchanged at 
ninth in 2006 and 2007, its dependence on defense revenues grew from 48% in 
2002 to 53.6% in 2007.  Originally owned by the Italian state holding company, 
Instituto per la Riconstruzione Industriale (IRI), Finmeccanica was converted into the 
Italian national champion for defense in the 1989-1995 period.  By 1997, the 
company was in serious financial difficulties, and under new management, was 
converted from a conglomerate to a financial holding company concerned with 
developing and managing trans-European programs in defense and aerospace.  
This was accomplished by the formation of joint companies with international 
partners.  Yet later, Finmeccanica was again transformed from a financial holding 
company into an industrial group in its own right.  It now employs approximately 
65,000 persons worldwide, and its activities focus on advanced aerospace, defense, 
homeland security, communications, energy, transportation, helicopters, radar 
systems, UAV, and underwater systems. 
Since its restructuring, Finmeccanica has adopted an industrial strategy 
based on international alliances and partnerships.  Several years ago, it was 
estimated that such alliances accounted for some 80% of its aerospace and defense 
revenues (Vlachos-Dengler, 2004,  p. 47). Such ventures were designed, in part, to 
compensate for the organization’s lack of critical mass required to serve as prime 
contractor in its core activities.   
At the international level, Alenia has participated in the Eurofighter Typhoon 
program, the trinational Tornado multirole combat aircraft, the AMX tactical support 
and reconnaissance aircraft with Embraer of Brazil (partnered with Alenia’s 
Aermacchi), the ATR42MP, a maritime patrol application of the ATR42 commuter 
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In the US, Alenia has successfully competed for the US 101 Presidential 
helicopter, via its Agusta-Westland Helicopter division (partnered with Lockheed 
Martin),  and the C27J Spartan Joint Cargo Aircraft for the US Army and Air Force 
(partnered with L-3 Communications, and Boeing).  It is the major Italian industrial 
partner on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and a partner with Boeing on the new 787 
Dreamliner.  Alenia also hopes to interest the US Air Force and Navy in the Alenia- 
Aermacchi M346 advanced jet trainer. 
In the words of the President and CEO of Alenia North America: 
It is our goal to become a real American company within the framework of our 
parent company.  We want to have our own independent industrial and 
technical capability through our joint ventures.  Our company will generate 
revenues and profit for our shareholders and will help to achieve 
Finmeccanica’s strategic target of expanding its presence in the US market.  
Alenia North America is in the process of establishing a defense company 
under Alenia NA, with a Special Security Agreement that will allow us to 
further expand our business in the US military market. (Giordo, 2007, pp. 16-
17) 
Satisfying US security requirements will be somewhat complicated because 
of the role of the Italian state in Finmeccanica’s operations.  While this role has been 
reduced somewhat by the dismantling of IRI in 2000 and the company’s 
privatization, the Italian government retains a 25-30% stake in the company and at 
least one representative on the board of directors.  Its partnership on a regional 
jetliner with Sukhoi of Russia may also be troublesome.   
Our respondents conceded that they have a captive market at home, but 
noted that Italian defense spending is so low, that, in order to survive and grow, they 
have to seek alternative markets abroad.  However, they decided against structurally 
joining Airbus or EADS. 
Of interest were the observations made that compared winning contracts in 
Europe with winning in the US.  For example, the role of offsets was described as 
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suggests that product quality dominates the decision making.  In addition, past 
performance is all important, especially in winning the role of prime contractor.  It 
was emphasized that to do business in the US, a foreign firm must collaborate with a 
US prime to insure domestic content,60 and also, if possible, introduce new 
technology.  The British Harrier would appear to be a good example.   
Our respondents noted that despite their successes with the Presidential 
helicopter and the C27J joint cargo aircraft, Alenia was not yet ready to win a 
contract in the role of prime contractor in the US.  This was due, in part, to their 
failure, thus far, in obtaining a sufficiently large industrial position.  They see their 
role as providing niche products while collaborating with their US partners.  In 
response to a question asking them to identify their major American competitors, 
they provided the interesting answer that they currently see other European-based 
firms, such as EADS, as their principal competition.  They are continuously 
searching out their best strategic alliances such as Lockheed Martin on the Joint 
Striker Fighter and Boeing on the 787 Dreamliner.  However, they emphasized that 
they are not interested in a general alliance and prefer to treat each program 
separately.   
The American practice of having Congress act on budget matters annually 
was seen by our respondents as emphasizing the importance of remaining on good 
terms with its members.  Decision on the location of facilities within the US was seen 
as an effective and legal way to accomplish that goal.  Finmeccanica and Alenia 
appear to have learned that lesson well.  A rough count of the location of 
Finmeccanica facilities in the US reveals 17 states.  Alenia, by itself accounts for 9, 
excluding the District of Columbia.  Perhaps this might be interpreted as a micro-
application of their vision of Italy playing a role as a bridge between Europe and the 
US.  In the spring of 2008, Finmeccanica employed more than 1,200 persons in their 
US facilities, a figure which they expect to reach 2,000 in the near future.   
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Their preference is to grow “organically” or from the ground up rather than via 
acquisition of other defense firms.  However, their attempt to acquire the US firm, 
DRS Technologies, Inc., revealed in May of 2008, appears at variance with that 
preference.  A press analysis of that deal stressed the new attractiveness of such 
high technology firms to larger defense conglomerates, in part, because of the 
soaring demand for their advanced products,and the fact that such products don’t 
require the huge capital investments associated with the production of such “big 
ticket” items as aircraft, ships, and tanks (Michaels, 2008, p. B3; Nativi & Butler, 
2008, pp. 40-41). 
Of particular interest were comments by a high-ranking Alenia executive 
concerning the more recent successes of European firms in competition with their 
US counterparts.  Three factors were emphasized: 
 European firms have more experience in international competition 
resulting from their necessity to seek markets abroad due to the 
relatively small size of their domestic defense budgets. 
 The advancing age of US defense engineers and the declining rate at 
which their replacements are being trained has created a significant 
problem for the US.  Our respondent put the average age of 
Lockheed’s engineers at 54. 
 The procurement processes of other nations are less bureaucratic than 
those of the US. 
He also stressed the difference in business plans between US and European 
firms, emphasizing the cash flow orientation of American firms, which requires a 
faster payoff schedule and a short run orientation, hence a higher price.  Another 
factor which may be weakening US firms’ ability to compete is the heavy role played 
by the US government in the sale of its military products.  Examples given were the 
essentially non-competitive nature of the international sales of such aircraft as the F-
15, F-16, and the JSF, which our respondent saw as sold by the US government as 
a political phenomenon. 
The captive US market for American firms may also be weakening their ability 
to compete internationally.  An example was given of the C-130 military transport.  
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competitive, US firms had forgotten how to compete and were not very successful.  
Our respondent saw a serious risk of loss of market by American firms.  In his 
opinion, they must learn to rely on more than World Trade Organization (WTO) 
appeals.  When coupled with these potential weaknesses of US firms, foreign 
competitors may find a bright future in supplying certain niche areas of the US 
defense market. 
Our respondent complained of widespread lack of understanding in the US of 
the regulations detailing the responsibilities of foreign suppliers to the US defense 
establishment.  Bilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) for example, treat 
foreign suppliers as if they were US suppliers.  Foreign suppliers generally are 
successful in preventing politics from intruding into their contractual obligations.  
Italian firms may be headquartered in Rome, but they must act as if they were a 
global enterprise.  Finmeccanica’s shares may be traded on the Milan stock 
exchange, but 30 to 40% of those shares are owned by institutional investors from 
the US.  He complained of a failure to understand the importance of both foreign 
investors and foreign customers.  For example, the reluctance to permit foreign 
buyers to acquire the new US F-22 Raptor aircraft have hurt as the expected 
domestic orders from the DoD have not been realized.  His view was that US 
politicians have very little appreciation of the important role played by exports and by 
foreign partners in significant American projects.  As he put it, “Buy American laws 
are bad for the US, bad for US forces, and bad for US firms.”61 
To be successful, in his view, competing firms must offer the best products 
and this requires that they understand what the customer wants.  He turned his 
attention, momentarily, to the now famous aerial refueling tanker competition, and 
gave his opinion that if the originally successful EADS-Northrop proposal.was 
                                            
61 This statement is part of the Finmeccanica-Alenia interview held in the Washington area in the Spring of 2008.  The 
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rejected, the global market reaction would be negative and foreign countries might 
reconsider doing business with the US in the military marketplace. 
With respect to the Italian experience on the Eurofighter project, Italy was 
quite satisfied with the juste retour arrangement that managed industrial 
participation.  He felt that much of value was learned dealing with the management 
of technology and people.  As his group moved from earlier models such as the 
AMX and the ATR to military jets, much of the experience moved with them, and the 
Eurofighter was a critical experience in the application of composite technology to 
the next generation of military aircraft.  Now, his group is confident that they have 
the ability to perform well on such advanced aircraft as the JSF and the 787 
Dreamliner.   
With respect to the JSF, he noted that Alenia was not satisfied with its access 
to all advanced technology.  He emphasized that more than building the airplane 
was involved and questions of whether it would fly well must also be considered.  
Matters of operational sovereignty were paramount and it was critical that 
Finmeccanica fully understand how to maintain the aircraft during its useful life.  He 
noted that in a sense, electronics was a “sacred cow” and that in this area the US 
government had not gone far enough to satisfy the needs of the partner companies.  
He was unhappy with ITAR regulations dealing with technology transfer and third 
country sales, and expressed the view that all partners were not treated equally.  In 
his opinion, the UK is being favored.  On matters of work share on the JSF, Alenia is 
relatively satisfied and feels that Lockheed understands the wants and needs of its 
partners. 
In response to our question, the respondent noted that Finmeccanica did not 
face much competition within Italian industry in its work on the JSF nor did he see 
evidence that non-traditional industries were involved in the project.  He made the 
interesting observation that there was more competition within Finmeccanica as to 
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Also of interest was his observation that politics played a much larger role on 
the Eurofighter project than on the JSF, in which the best quality seems to determine 
who does what.  He also singled out with satisfaction the fact that Italy was involved 
from the very beginning of the project in system design issues.  Italy is responsible 
for the center wing box and serves as a second source on final assembly and as 
follow-on supplier. 
BAE Systems 
BAE Systems of the UK is, by far, the largest European defense producer, 
ranking third globally with defense revenues of $29.8 billion in 2007, a gain of 18.7% 
from its 2006 figure.  Its 2007 revenue from defense sales represented 95.0% of its 
total revenue (Boessenkool, 2008, p. 12).   It clearly dominates the UK defense 
market.  Its North American market, its largest, has grown rapidly in recent years, 
increasing from 34% of sales in 2002 to approximately 50% in 2007.  Much of this 
gain was associated with its acquisition of two major US producers of armored 
products (United Defense and Armor Holdings) in a time of high demand for such 
items. 
In response to a question in a recent interview, asking whether BAE will, in 5 
years, resemble its present form, Walter P. Havenstein, President and CEO of BAE 
Systems, Inc. (BAE’s US subsidiary) replied: 
I’d be surprised if you didn’t see a company that looked quite different 
[because] the growth opportunities will invariably move around.  Before 9/11 
(2001)[…] BAE Systems did not have a global land systems business.  We do 
today.  So I would be surprised if some other inflection point didn’t occur 
during the next five years that would cause us to shift.  And I think that’s one 
of the things that BAE Systems has been able to do fairly well.  Think about 
what we did in just the last 18 months:  the acquisition of United Defense, 
creating a global land and armament systems business, and exiting Airbus.  
We’ve made some fairly strong moves. (Velocci and Anselmo,  pp. 68-69) 
After its earlier acquisition of Britain’s Alvis, and the US- based United 
Defense and Armor Holdings, BAE has surpassed General Dynamics as the world’s 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 70 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
was primarily a builder of tracked armored vehicles.  Armor Holdings manufactures 
the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle and a family of heavy-and medium-
weight tactical trucks acquired after its recent purchase of Stewart & Stevenson.  
This permits BAE to satisfy the demand for tactical vehicles emerging from the 
intersection of needs for armored combat vehicles and their support vehicles (Chuter 
& Muradian, 2007, p. 1).     A BAE Systems company publication describes it as “the 
premier global defence and aerospace company, delivering a full range of products 
and services for air, land and naval forces, as well as advanced electronics, 
information technology solutions and customer support services.” 
It might also be noted that by its acquisitions, BAE has not only diversified to 
meet the needs of all military services, but also positioned itself to be an important 
supplier of both traditional high technology systems as well as equipment needed for 
asymmetric, guerrilla style combat.62 
In the above-noted interview, Walter P. Havenstein, President and CEO of 
BAE’s US subsidiary stressed the importance of in-house R&D spending.  In answer 
to a question, he observed: 
I’ve got a whole bunch of Skunk Works. [Across the US] we have several 
innovation centers, some fairly sophisticated modeling and simulation labs, a 
networking lab.  All those labs are connected.  So the idea is to be able to 
create a Skunk Works in a virtual sense […]Our land and armaments 
business has what we call dome simulators, and probably the next thing on 
our agenda is to start integrating these simulation centers across our 
operating groups. 
BAE’s efforts to introduce its research results into its products is illustrated by 
the work of its Electronics & Integrated Solutions operating group whose 
headquarters are located in Nashua, New Hampshire.  According to E&IS President 
Michael A. Heffron, his group has focused on “recapitalization” that involves 
                                            
62 It might be noted also that as a result of such acquisitions, BAE has not only obtained capital 
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changing parts or adding new capabilities incorporating the latest technology without 
changing any of the existing functions.  This is usually cheaper than replacing an 
entire existing system with a new one.  Current open architecture computer systems 
permit the rewriting of software for the latest platforms capable of more rapid 
information processing that often adds new capabilities.  An example of this process 
is E&IS’s success in developing a new computer processor for the ALE-47 
countermeasures dispenser that increases processing speed and boosts memory by 
a factor of eight, permitting the system to deal with the latest threats.  The ALE-47 
device was recently estimated to be carried by 3,000 aircraft flown by the US and its 
allies, suggesting a sizeable potential market (Hughes, 2007, pp. 68-69). 
Our interview began with the BAE respondent stressing how important the US 
subsidiary had become in the total operations of the parent company.  Apparently, 
both the parent company and the US elements have won important contracts in the 
US.  In addition to the armor work stressed above, BAE has a major role in the 
production plan for the Joint Strike Fighter, being responsible for providing the center 
fuselage.  Hundreds of BAE engineers are employed in the US for this project.  BAE 
is providing 17% of the content of the JSF.  He also reminded us of other 
accomplishments of BAE in the US, such as its partnership with Boeing on the 
Harrier, and its provision of heads up display units to many US airlines.  It is also 
acting as partner with Textron on a light weight artillery piece.   
Vlachos-Dengler (2004, p. 20) has noted how difficult it would be for a foreign 
firm to obtain prime contractor responsibilities on an American defense contract.63  
Nevertheless, our respondent indicated his belief that BAE might be approaching 
such an opportunity, given its successes in recent years.  They understand the 
implications of the 51% domestic requirements in DoD contracting and have “played 
by the book.”  We were told that BAE had responded to 56 separate requests for 
quotes and had never lodged a protest about the outcomes.  In her above-cited 
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work, Vlachos-Dengler (2004) quoted the comment of a senior BAE official to the 
effect that  “the only way to effectively enter the US defense market is to become a 
US company.”64   Apparently BAE has found a way to accomplish this.   
It appears that the acquisition of successful American defense firms has been 
the favored method.  However, such acquisitions have not always been easily 
absorbed.  Our respondent stressed that the key to successfully absorbing another 
firm is the recognition of the difficult cultural shift involved in such a transaction.  He 
emphasized that “from day one, the new employees are carefully treated as 
members of the BAE team” with major efforts to avoid the sense that two distinct 
classes of employees are present, the new ones and the veterans.  All are provided 
with BAE badges, signs, and phones.  The goal is to bring about a fit, both culturally 
and technically, to facilitate BAE’s investment in the technical skills of the acquired 
company.   
Our respondent noted that to introduce a product into the US, it was 
necessary to focus on creating jobs and not in the abstract.  In other words, you 
must specify where those jobs would be located.  This solidifies the promise of a 
favorable economic impact and increases the probability of success.  It also would 
be helpful to invite an American partner to assume the role of prime contractor.  BAE 
is not trying to integrate horizontally.  
BAE’s decision to acquire another firm is, of course, dependent on what that 
firm appears to offer and, on occasion, an earlier acquisition by the target firm 
strengthens its attractiveness.  An example was given of GE Marconi which had 
acquired Tracor in 1998 for $1.4 billion.  Tracor’s headquarters were in Austin, 
Texas, and it had a strong position in information systems, electronic warfare, and 
other avionics, making it a promising candidate for acquisition.  Marconi was 
absorbed by BAE in the 2000.   
                                            




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 73 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
When it comes to special security protection, BAE Systems faces the same 
requirements as any other foreign firm.  They have a Special Security Agreement 
that provides access to classified US Government programs.  To be eligible to bid, 
win, and work on contracts involving classified information, they are guided by the 
National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, and must prove compliance 
with the Arms Export Control and Export Administration Acts.  Among other things, 
they have a Special Board of Directors consisting of seven distinguished US 
citizens.  Our respondent indicated that the company was proud of the stature of its 
special board that includes three retired 4-star generals, one each from the US 
Army, Air Force and Marine Corps, a retired full admiral of the US Navy, a former 
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, a former Undersecretary of State for 
Security, Science, and Technology, and a former distinguished member of 
Congress.  We were also told that this board provides BAE with a shield, as it were, 
to help it appear like an American company with no extraordinary risk of technology 
loss to a foreign country.  Despite the emphasis on growth through acquisition, it 
was pointed out that BAE had also experienced some organic growth as well. 
In an organization structured like BAE, an interesting question arises as to 
how work is divided between the parent company in the UK and its various 
subsidiaries located abroad.  An example is provided by its participation in the Joint 
Strike Fighter project.  BAE is responsible for providing 1/3 of the fuselage of the 
aircraft.  The parent company bears this responsibility and delivers its product to Fort 
Worth stuffed with all necessary parts and equipment.  An important component 
consists of electronics, which are provided by a unit of BAE North America.  This 
division of labor reflects the fact that so-called “metal bending” work is done by BAE 
facilities in the UK while the US unit has specialized in electronics work.   Intra-
corporate coordination is obviously an important challenge.  
Our respondent reported satisfaction with the UK’s participation in design and 
access to technology on the JSF project.  However, the issue of operational 
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systems of its aircraft in times of war without US permission or participation.   Like 
other representatives of the British government and industry with whom we have 
discussed the issue, our respondent appeared quite satisfied with the agreement 
reached between US representatives and Lord Drayson, the former British 
procurement chief.  It would be well to remember the caveat of a responsible 
Lockheed executive, however, who cautioned that the proof will be in the pudding—
in this case, watching the operation of the agreement on a case-by-case basis. 
Our respondent also expressed amazement at the behavior of several 
members of Congress, who, in their efforts to defend the interests of constituent 
industry, behaved like they were really representatives of the company rather than of 
their individual constituents.  It sounded to us as if he were wondering about a 
possible redefinition of the term “public interest.”  On the other hand, he expressed a 
high level of admiration for the professional acumen of the force acquisition 
community in the Defense Department. 
Concluding Thoughts on the Cases 
At the conclusion of this examination of the experience of foreign firms in 
penetrating the US defense market, several generalizations emerge.  They may be 
grouped in three areas.  First, why do foreign firms desire to penetrate the US 
defense market?  The answers may appear obvious, but their importance varies 
from case to case.  A factor that is present almost across the board is the relatively 
low level of domestic defense spending for military procurement outside the US.  
When married to the almost universal desire to maintain at least some minimum 
essential level of domestic competence in defense industry, participation in the 
export market becomes essential.  The quality challenges required to meet high 
standards demanded by US procurement officials provide a spur to foreign firms with 
a desire to sell to the DoD.  Technology acquisition resulting from work with 
experienced and high quality US partners is also a welcome potential advantage.  
The reputation for high quality standards demanded by the US military spills over as 
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reputations for quality work.  Last, but certainly,not unimportant, are profit 
opportunities associated with long production runs, rarely found outside the United 
States. 
A second area deals with the obstacles found by foreign firms attempting to 
sell to the DoD.  Again, these are well known, but certainly not impenetrable as 
proved by the successes of firms like the three examined above.  First, is the level of 
domestic protectionism encountered in the US Congress.  Foreign critics often cite 
the “Buy American” Acts, but innovative foreign firms with a desire to sell in the US 
have found ways to circumvent the most extreme application of these laws.  It 
should also be noted that the US did not invent Buy National legislation, so dramatic 
mea culpas are probably unnecessary.  Perhaps more difficult to overcome are long-
standing relationships at the personal level between US industry and the DoD.  On 
the other hand, the Pentagon has gradually acquired a respectable list of European 
defense products that has strengthened the level of transatlantic cooperation.65  The 
US export control regime remains another obstacle but, again, not an impenetrable 
one. 
One might also look for lessons to be learned from the successful experience 
of EADS (despite the frustrating fight over the aerial refueling tanker case), 
Finmeccanica/Alenia, and BAE.  It would appear that locating facilities in the US, 
preferably teaming with an American firm, is a potentially significant advantage.  
Offering a superior product is an obvious necessity but not just any product.  Firms 
that have been able to provide a superior product occupying a particular niche and 
performing an important function, which, for whatever reason, American firms have 
largely ignored, have a real advantage.   
Finally, recent experiences such as those related above, may be casting new 
light on the old argument of a two-way street in defense trade between the US and 
                                            
65 For an interesting discussion of this issue, see the editorial entitled “Europe’s Turn To Open Up” 
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Europe, or, rather, its absence.  A more contemporary view of such trade may show 
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Section V. Concluding Thoughts 
As noted, this report continues our inquiry into global defense industrial base.  
As among other things, we’ve acquired a firm grasp of the obvious: defense 
industrial affairs are becoming increasingly international and increasingly complex.  
While the trend is certainly not new, we may well be approaching some qualitative 
changes in the nature of this complicated system. 
The complexity and cost of modern military acquisition projects are 
fundamentally changing the nature of economies of scale.  Production runs that can 
exploit available economies of scale and learning curves are increasingly beyond the 
means of single nations.  Furthermore, the risks entailed by these projects have 
become matters of grave concern for even the largest prime contractors.66 
This has been reflected on both the supply and demand sides of the defense 
marketplace.  Increasingly, new weapon systems (such as the Joint Strike Fighter) 
have become international ventures—albeit with senior partners.  On the supply 
side, defense industrial firms have undertaken, for a number of reasons, projects 
through outsourcing arrangements, risk-sharing consortia, and strategic 
partnerships.  In addition, the number of first-tier firms has steadily declined.67 
It’s reasonably safe to conclude that inter-firm relationships are more a 
product of context and project than by the firm boundaries of more traditional 
thought.  Thus, major industrial firms (such as Boeing and Lockheed-Martin) can 
compete in some areas (e.g., tactical fighters) and cooperate in others (e.g., the 
next-generation US bomber).  The predictable result has been the increasing 
complexities and management difficulties associated with major projects.  Boeing’s 
                                            
66 The difficulty has less to do with the requisite number of units and more with the unit costs. 
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problems with the Dreamliner are instructive for defense market players, even 
though the 787 is a commercial project. 
Given the increasing complexity of defense enterprises, it’s not surprising to 
predict that a small number of first-tier suppliers have attained increasing market 
power with respect to their government customers.  While market structure certainly 
matters, it also appears that relatively agile, opportunistic defense suppliers can 
simply outclass their bureaucratic customers.  As Section IV demonstrates, 
government regulations cannot create impenetrable barriers to firms in search of 
profits—through mergers, acquisition and “organic” direct investment across national 
borders.  The KC-45 affair seems a clear demonstration of the suppliers’ increased 
power.  There is reason to believe that suppliers not only influence the terms of the 
competition, but they can, on occasion, dictate them.  The NG-EADS threat to 
withdraw from the KC-45 competition (2007) followed by the Boeing threat to do the 
same (2008) illustrate this point.  In both cases, it appears both firms got (basically) 
what they wanted.  Other defense suppliers have no doubt observed the results. 
There seem to be at least two problems for the sovereign buyers to solve in 
the defense marketplace.  First, institutions and regulations (such as export control 
regimes) probably need thorough reconsideration.  The failure to successfully select 
a new Air Force tanker (yet) indicates strongly the need to adapt defense acquisition 
institutions to the new global defense environment.  Likely, those institutions need to 
become more adaptive to a rapidly changing military environment as well a changing 
defense marketplace. 
The second problem is becoming and remaining a knowledgeable customer.68  
We believe this means taking better care of the human capital accounts in the 
defense work force and formulating intelligent strategies for managing increasingly 
complex military systems (and systems of systems) throughout very long life spans. 
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